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Article 
GUANTANAMO, BOUMEDIENE, AND 
JURISDICTION-STRIPPING: THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENT MEETS THE IMPERIAL COURT 
Martin J. Katz* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Boumediene v. Bush, 1 the Supreme Court struck down a 
major pillar of President Bush's war on terror: the indefinite de-
tention of terror suspects in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Court 
held that even non-citizen prisoners held by the United States 
government on foreign soil could challenge their confinement by 
seeking a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, and that the 
procedures the government had provided for such challenges 
were not an adequate substitute for the writ." 
As a habeas corpus case, Boumediene may well be revolu-
tionary.3 However, Boumediene is more than merely a habeas 
* Interim Dean and Associate Professor of Law. University of Denver College of 
Law; Yale Law School. J.D. 1991: Harvard College. A.B. 1987. Thanks to Alan Chen. 
Laurence Claus. Richard Fallon. Scott Moss. and James Pfander. as well as to the Colo-
rado Employment Law Faculty (Rachel Arnow-Richman. Roberta Corrada. Helen Nor-
ton. and Nantiya Ruan) for their comments on drafts. Any errors are my own. The au-
thor served as counsel in the jurisdiction-stripping case. Painter v. Sha/ala. 97 F.3d 1351 
(lOth Cir. 1996). 
1. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
2. See id. at 2340. 
3. See id. at 2293-94 (Scalia. J .. dissenting) ("Today. for the first time in our Na-
tion's history. the Court confers a constitutional right to habeas corpus on alien enemies 
detained abroad by our military forces in the course of an ongoing war."): see also Glenn 
Sulmasy. The Supreme Court Made a Mistake in Boumediene. U.S. NEWS. June 19.2008. 
The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Boumediene v. Bush last week justifiably 
sent shock waves through the legal community. The majority opinion. authored 
by the ever wandering Justice Anthony Kennedy. disregarded both centuries of 
precedent and the military deference doctrine and also intruded on what is 
377 
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corpus case. This Article will argue that, at its core, Boumediene 
should be understood as a case about separation of powers. 
More specifically, it should be understood as a case about the 
Court's vision of separation of powers-a vision in which federal 
courts serve to keep the political branches within the bounds of 
the Constitution and, most importantly, in which the political 
branches cannot evade judicial review by manipulating jurisdic-
tion. Hence, this Article will argue, the principles set out in 
Boumediene have significant implications for Congress's ability 
to restrict or eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts-a 
practice known as jurisdiction-stripping, which has been the sub-
ject of an intense, long-running debate among the giants of con-
stitutionallaw.4 
In Boumediene, the Court asserted a forceful view of judi-
cial power that it has hesitated to assert since the Founding. The 
Court's newfound willingness to assert this power may be criti-
cized as an exercise in judicial imperialism. But it also reflects a 
healthy inclination to counterbalance several recent, unprece-
dented assertions of power by the President, accompanied by 
apparent acquiescence from Congress. 
This Article will first summarize the long-running debate 
over jurisdiction-stripping. It will then show how the principles 
articulated in Boumediene suggest at least a partial resolution of 
that debate. Next, it will show that the resolution suggested by 
Boumediene is not limited to habeas cases-cases involving de-
tention; rather, Boumediene speaks to jurisdiction-stripping 
more generally. Finally, the Article will discuss the extraordinary 
significance of the fact that the Court has articulated these prin-
ciples now, after avoiding doing so for centuries. It will conclude 
that this timing is neither coincidental nor the product of an op-
portunistic judicial power grab. Rather, Boumediene represents 
a timely restoration of a healthy balance of power. 
clearly the province of the political branches. As a result of this case. Guanta-
namo Bay detainees now formally have more rights than do prisoners of war 
under the Geneva Conventions. 
Bw see Daniel R. Williams, Who Got Game? Boumediene v. Bush and the Judicial Ga-
mesmanship of Enemy-Combatant Detention, 43 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 1 (2008) (criticizing 
Boumediene as focused exclusively on process, rather than imposing substantive limita-
tions on the government). Other commentators have focused on the globalist aspects of 
the case. See, e.g .. David Cole. Rights over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and 
Guantanamo Bay. CATO S. CT. REV. 47 (2007/2008): Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterri-
torial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009). 
4. See infra note 13. 
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I. A VERY BRIEF PRIMER ON JURISDICTION-
STRIPPING: THREE QUESTIONS-FEW ANSWERS 
Ever since the Supreme Court declared that it had the pow-
er to review acts of Congress and the President for constitutio-
nality more than 200 years ago,; legal thinkers have wondered 
whether Congress could control this power by restricting the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts. The question has tended to come 
up most visibly in two contexts.fi 
First, in the wake of controversial federal court decisions, 
opponents have occasionally proposed laws to strip the federal 
courts of jurisdiction to hear the type of case that had been at is-
sue (presumably with the idea that state courts will ignore or 
refuse to apply the controversial precedent).7 For example, after 
the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, providing constitu-
tional protection for a right to abortion, some legislators pro-
posed legislation that would strip the federal courts of jurisdic-
tion to hear those cases.~ Similar legislation has been proposed in 
5. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
6. Actually. this issue also comes up in a third context: In administrative law sta-
tutes. which occasionally attempt to preclude judicial review of certain types of adminis-
trative actions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(i)(1) (precluding judicial review of agency's 
determination of Medicare "conversion factor"); Painter v. Shalala. 97 F.3d 1351 (lOth 
Cir. 1996) (upholding that jurisdiction-stripping statute as constitutional). For a compre-
hensive study of the more recent occasions on which Congress has curtailed federal court 
jurisdiction. see Benjamin Keele. Ganging Up Against the Courts: Congressional Cur-
tailment of Judicial Review, 1988-2004. 7 PI SIGMA ALPHA UNDERGRADUATE J. POL. 
174 (2007); see also Helen L. Norton. Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress's Latest 
Challenge to Judicial Review. 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1003 (2006) (cataloguing and 
analyzing recent jurisdiction-stripping bills). 
7. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
152 (3d ed. 2006); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the 
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation. 101 N.W. U. L. REV. 191. 193-94 
(2007) (discussing modern jurisdiction-stripping proposals and suggesting that they 
represent "something of a watershed" in the level of antagonism expressed by Congress 
toward the courts). There is. of course, an irony in the use of jurisdiction-stripping as a 
method of dealing with unpopular court decisions: Even if Congress successfully re-
moved jurisdiction from some or all courts. the unpopular decision would remain on the 
books-the law of the land. However. the point of this type of jurisdiction-stripping can 
be seen either ( 1) as an attempt to limit the damage done by the unpopular decision by 
precluding other courts from applying that precedent to new cases. or (2) as an invitation 
to state courts or the political branches to ignore that precedent by removing the possibil-
ity that their decisions would be reviewed. In fact, one recent proposal (which did not 
become law) went so far as to provide that any decision by a federal court covered by its 
jurisdiction-stripping provision would "not [be] binding precedent on any state court." 
See Constitutional Restoration Act of 2005. S. 520. 109th Cong .. § 301 (2005). 
8. See, e.g .. S. 158. 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 867, 97th Cong. (1981) (proposed bills 
restricting federal jurisdiction in abortion cases). There have even been calls for stripping 
the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear abortion cases in the academy. See, e.g., Jason S. 
Greenwood, Comment. Congressional Control of Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Case 
Study of Abortion, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1069 (2003). 
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response to decisions on school busing, loyalty oaths, school 
prayer, reapportionment, and the pledge of allegiance.9 Notably, 
in this context, while the constitutionality of such legislation has 
been hotly debated, such legislation has rarely if ever been 
passed-perhaps as a result of Congressional doubt regarding 
the constitutionality, or at least the wisdom, of such legislation. 10 
A second context in which jurisdiction-stripping has been 
proposed-and actually passed-is during times of armed con-
flict. During such times, Congress has occasionally attempted to 
restrict federal court jurisdiction as a way to maximize the Presi-
dent's ability to wage war-for example, permitting him to de-
tain those seen as an impediment to the war effort. 11 It was a sta-
tute such as this that was at issue in Boumediene. In the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2004 and Military Commission Act 
of 2006, 12 Congress (1) created a non-judicial procedure for de-
termining whether certain individuals are "enemy combatants," 
and thus subject to detention, and (2) limited the ability of the 
federal courts to review such determinations. 
Generally, when Congress has passed, or even proposed, ju-
risdiction-stripping legislation, it has spawned debate over 
whether such legislation is or would be constitutional. This de-
bate has engaged the minds of many of the country's finest con-
stitutional scholars. 13 
9. See, e.g .. Pledge Protection Act of 2005. H.R. 2389. 109th Cong. (2005) (pledge 
of allegiance); S. 481. 97th Cong.; H.R. 4756. 97th Cong. (1981) (school prayer); Student 
Transportation Moratorium Act of 1972. S. 3388. 92d Cong.; H.R. 13916. 92d Cong. 
(1972) (school busing); Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1972. S. 3395. 92d Cong.; 
H.R. 13915. 92d Cong. (1972) (school busing); H.R. 11926. 88th Cong. (1964) (reappor-
tionment); S. 3386. 85th Cong. (1958) (loyalty oaths); see also Scott Moss. An Appeal by 
Any Other Name: Congress's Empty Victory Over Habeas Rights, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 249. 249 (1997) (noting that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996. Pub. L. 104-132. 110 Stat. 1214. 1217-26 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. 
and 21 U.S.C.) (1996). was a jurisdiction-restrictive response to court's perceived molly-
coddling of convicted killers) 
10. See RICHARD H. FALLON. JR .. ET AL.. HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 322 (5th ed. 2003) ("At least since the 1930s. no bill 
that has been interpreted to withdraw all federal court jurisdiction with respect to a par-
ticular substantive area has become law.") (citation omitted) [hereinafter HART & 
WECHSLER]. 
11. See, e.g .. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006) (limiting 
federal court jurisdiction to hear claims by enemy combatants); Ex Parte McCardle, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (upholding law striking down one basis for Supreme Court ju-
risdiction). 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). 
13. See HART & WECHSLER. supra note 10, at 322 ("[D]ebates about the constitu-
tionality of legislation withdrawing federal jurisdiction as a signal of substantive disa-
greement have spawned a body of literature that has been described as 'choking on re-
dundancy."') (citation omitted); Moss. supra note 9, at 250 (referring to jurisdiction-
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to revisit the debates of 
these constitutional scholars. My purpose here is not to weigh in 
on the question of how courts should address jurisdiction-
stripping statutes (though this Article does implicate that issue). 
Rather, my purpose here is to address how the Supreme Court-
after centuries of largely avoiding the debate-has now sug-
gested answers to certain fundamental questions in that debate. 
Accordingly, this Part will identify some of the fundamental 
questions in that debate. 
The primary question is when, if ever, Congress can strip ju-
risdiction from the federal courts. However, for Congress to be 
able to do this, it would need to exercise two distinct powers: 
(1) the power to strip jurisdiction from the lower federal courts, 
and (2) the power to strip appellate jurisdiction from the Su-
preme Court. So this section will begin by examining both of 
those powers before examining whether Congress can combine 
those powers in order to preclude all federal court jurisdiction.14 
stripping debate as ''a cottage industry"). While the debate may be thick. it includes im-
portant articles by many of the "greats" of modem constitutional law. See, e.g.. Akhil 
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985): Paul M. Bator. Congressional Power Over the 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982): Steven G. Calabresi & 
Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: 
A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia. 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007): Laurence 
Claus, The One Court that Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Ar-
ticle III, 96 GEO. L.J. 59 (2007): Robert N. Clinton. A Mandatory View of Federal Court 
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III. 132 U. PA. L. 
REv. 741 (1984): Theodore Eisenberg, Constitutional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal 
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974): Richard H. Fallon, Jr.. Some Confusions 
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
309 (1993); Gerald Gunther. Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: 
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984): Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise 
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Daniel J. Meltzer. The History and Structure 
of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); James E. Pfander. Article I Tribunals, Ar-
ticle III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States. 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 
(2004); Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power 
to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Inter-
nal and External Examination. 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982): Ronald D. Rotunda. Con-
gressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and the Problem 
of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 (1976): Lawrence Gene Sager. Constitutional Limita-
tions on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts. 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 17 (1981): Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored 
Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129 (1981); William W. 
Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973): Her-
bert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1965). 
14. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 330 (listing these issues). Hart & 
Wechsler also list three additional issues: (1) jurisdiction-stripping statutes that leave 
state courts available to hear cases (an issue I discuss below, see infra notes 103-107 and 
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This Part will also show how the Court has gone to great lengths 
to avoid providing definitive answers to these questions (particu-
larly to the question of the ability of Congress to preclude all 
federal court jurisdiction). 
A. STRIPPING JURISDICTION FROM LOWER FEDERAL COURTS 
The first question in the jurisdiction-stripping debate is 
whether Congress can restrict the jurisdiction of the lower feder-
al courts (district courts and circuit courts) to hear a particular 
type of case. This question assumes that only the lower federal 
cour~s ~re_ cl?sed- th~t t?e Su~,reme Court's original and appel-
late JUriSdictiOn remams mtact. · 
Proponents of allowing this form of jurisdiction-stripping 
point to the text of Article III, which gives Congress the power 
to "ordain and establish" lower federal courts. 16 The argument is 
that (1) the Ordain and Establish Clause gave Congress discre-
tion over whether to create lower federal courts, and (2) if Con-
gress could decline to create lower federal courts, then Congress 
can limit such courts' jurisdiction.17 
Most commentators today seem to accept the basic idea that 
the Ordain and Establish Clause permits Congress to restrict or 
even eliminate the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 1R 
accompanying text). (2) jurisdiction-stripping statutes that leave Article I administrative 
courts to hear cases (an issue I discuss below, see infra note 107). and (3) statutes which 
apportion jurisdiction among federal courts (an issue that is not implicated by Boume-
diene. which I therefore do not address). See id. Nor do I address the possibility of Con-
gress attempting to preclude the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. There would 
seem to be no textual basis for such an action and, perhaps for that reason. no one ap-
pears to have suggested such a possibility. 
15. Much of the commentary regarding stripping lower federal court jurisdiction 
also assumes the availability of state courts to hear cases. possibly with appellate review 
by the U.S. Supreme court. See, e.g .. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 342-34; Hart, 
supra note 13; Meltzer. supra note 13. at 1627; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limita-
tions on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor 
Sager. 77 N.W. L Rev. 143. 157 (1982). The importance of this assumption will be dis-
cussed below. See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text. 
16. See U.S. CONST. art. III.§ 1 (vesting judicial power in '"one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish"). 
17. See Bator. supra note 13. at 1030 (explaining argument). As Professor Bator 
noted. it is not just the "ordain and establish" clause that supports this argument. The 
argument is also supported by the Madisonian Compromise. which is reflected in that 
clause-that is. the idea that Congress would have the power to decide whether or not to 
create lower federal courts. See id. 
18. See, e.g .. id. at 1030; Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court's Juris-
diction. 27 VILL L REV. 959. 960-62 (1982) (arguing that Congress has discretion to cur-
tail lower court jurisdiction based on the Ordain and Establish Clause); see also Gunther. 
supra note 13. at 912 (noting the difficulty of refuting the "ordain and establish" argu-
ment and also noting that the argument is "widely supported" by commentators). But see 
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Some of these commentators have also suggested that there 
might be limits on this power. For example, nearly all commen-
tators have suggested that the "ordain and establish" power is 
limited by substantive provisions elsewhere in the Constitution, 
such as the Equal Protection Clause; so Congress could not, for 
example, preclude jurisdiction only over cases brought by Afri-
can Americans or Catholics.'y Also, as noted above, most of the 
commentators who believe Congress has the power to limit low-
er federal court jurisdiction assume that some alternative court 
would remain open to hear the cases in question-an assumption 
which is likely incorrect in a case like Boumediene. 20 But subject 
to these two potentiallimits,2' the "traditional view" is that Con-
gress can exercise its "ordain and establish" power to close lower 
federal courts.22 
The courts, too,23 seem largely to accept the "traditional 
view"- that Congress has the power to restrict lower federal 
court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has, on at least five occa-
sions, suggested that Congress can limit lower federal court ju-
risdiction pursuant to the Ordain and Establish Clause.2~ How-
ever, none of these cases appears to have tested the potential 
Eisenberg. supra note 13 (arguing that. in modern times. Congress could not decline to 
establish lower federal courts): Gordon G. Young. A Critical Reassessment of the Case 
Law Bearing on Congress's Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal 
Courts. 54 MD. L. REV. 132. 137 (1995) (arguing that precedents do not support. and may 
even limit. the traditional view of Congress's "ordain and establish" power). 
19. See, e.g., Bator. supra note 13. at 1034: Gunther. supra note 13. at 916-22: see 
also Bolling v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497. 500 (1954) (observing that the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause contains an Equal Protection component. applicable against the fed-
eral government): Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress 
and Federal Jurisdiction. 85 N.W. U. L. REV. 1. 6 n.27 (1990) (finding nearly universal 
agreement as to the invalidity of jurisdictional exclusion of cases brought by members of 
traditionally suspect classes):. 
20. See supra note 15. In Section I.C .. I will address what happens when no other 
federal court is left open. I will address the role of state courts in Section II.B.l.b. 
21. At least one commentator has suggested a third potential limit on the "ordain 
and establish" power. See, e.g .. Tribe. supra note 13. at 142-43 (arguing that it would be 
problematic for Congress to use its "ordain and establish" power selectively-i.e .. to dis-
favor certain rights-even when other courts might remain available). This idea seems to 
have gained more traction in discussions about Congressional power to strip all federal 
jurisdiction. See infra note 41. 
22. See Young. supra note 18. at 137 (referring to expansive view of "ordain and 
establish" power as the "traditional view"). 
23. I discuss the commentators· view before the courts' view because the former are 
far more numerous and detailed. As I note in the text below. one of the important as-
pects of jurisdiction-stripping jurisprudence is its paucity. See infra notes 48-52 and ac-
companying text: see also note 25 and text following note 35. 
24. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States. 321 U.S. 414 (1944): Lockerty v. Phillips. 319 
U.S. 182 (1943): Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co .. 303 U.S. 323 (1938): Kline v. Burke Constr. 
Co .. 260 U.S. 226 (1922): Sheldon v. Sill. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). 
384 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 25:377 
limits on the exercise of this power." As I will discuss below, 
Boumediene suggests such a limit.c6 
B. STRIPPING THE SUPREME COURT'S APPELLATE 
JURISDICfiON 
The second question in the jurisdiction-stripping debate is 
whether Congress can strip the Supreme Court of its appellate 
jurisdiction. This question assumes that the lower federal courts, 
as well as the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, remain 
'7 
open: 
The idea that Congress can strip the Supreme Court of its 
appellate jurisdiction flows primarily from the text of Article III, 
which gives Congress the power to make "Exceptions, and ... 
Regulations" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.2H At 
least some commentators have gone beyond this simple textual 
argument to suggest a structural purpose underlying this textual 
provision: that the Framers included this language to provide 
25. Most of those cases involved statutes that channeled jurisdiction to a particular 
lower federal court. rather than statutes that stripped jurisdiction from all lower federal 
courts. See, e.g .. Yakus v. United States. 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding requirement that 
appeals in price control cases be filed in designated emergency court of appeals): Locker-
ty v. Phillips. 319 U.S. 182 (1943) (same). Others of these cases involved a limitation on 
remedies. rather than a limit on lower courts' ability to hear cases. See, e.g., Lauf v. E.G. 
Shinner & Co .. 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (upholding limit on lower courts' ability to issue in-
junctions): Kline v. Burke Construction Co .. 260 U.S. 226 (1922) (same). And others in-
volved limits on lower federal courts' ability to hear state common law claims. as op-
posed to federal statutory or constitutional claims. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co .. 
260 U.S. 226 (1922) (upholding limit on lower federal courts' ability to issue injunctions 
against state courts in common law contract claims): Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 
(1850) (upholding limit on lower federal courts to hear diversity suits where diversity was 
created by assignment of a contract). So none of these cases tested whether there is a lim-
it on Congress's ability to strip lower federal court jurisdiction where no state court re-
mains available to hear the case. See generally Young. supra note 18 (questioning wheth-
er any of these precedents support a broad Congressional power to strip lower federal 
court jurisdiction). 
26. See infra Section II.B.2. (arguing that Boumediene limits Congress's power to 
close lower federal courts to cases where a competent factfinder remains available): Sec-
tion II.C.2. (arguing that this principle applies in all constitutional cases that are fact-
dependent). 
27. Some commentators in this debate assume that state courts would remain open. 
as well. See e.g. Hart. supra note 13 (elaborating on the need for state court uniformity in 
approaches to federal law): Ratner. supra note 13. at 201-{)2 (explaining need for Su-
preme Court to keep state courts in check and unify their positions on federal law). The 
importance of this assumption will be discussed below. See infra notes 105-107 and ac-
companying text. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 ("In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions. 
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."). 
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Congress with a means to check the power of the Supreme 
Court.29 
Most commentators accept the idea that the Exceptions 
Clause permits Congress to exercise such control over the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction.30 However, some notable 
commentators have suggested that there might be some limits on 
this power. For example, Professor Hart argued that Congress 
cannot use this power to destroy the "essential functions" of the 
Supreme Court, which include maintaining the supremacy and 
uniformity of federal law.31 Others have suggested that, at least 
in certain types of cases, Congress cannot use its Exceptions 
Clause power in a way that would foreclose all avenues to the 
Supreme Court.32 
As with the issue of lower court jurisdiction-stripping, the 
Supreme Court has only occasionally weighed in on the issue of 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction-stripping." The Court has 
said several times that Congress can use its Exceptions Clause 
29. See, e.g., Wechsler supra note 13. at 1005-D6. 
30. See generally Bator. supra note 13; Gunther. supra note 13; Van Alstyne. supra 
note 13; Wechsler supra note 13. at 1005-D6. A few commentators have rejected the ar-
gument. suggesting that the "regulations and exceptions" language was intended to modi-
fy the phrase "findings of fact"- that is. that Congress's power is limited to regulating the 
Court's review of findings of fact. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER. CONGRESS V. THE 
SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Henry J. Merry. Scope of the Supreme Court's Appel-
late Jurisdiction: Historical Basis. 47 MINN. L. REV. 53 (1962). But see HART & 
WECHSLER. supra note 10. at 337 n.ll ("[T]his revisionist view (advanced by Professors 
Berger and Merry] has attracted little support."). More recently, the idea that the power 
to make "exceptions" means a power to strip jurisdiction has been challenged by textual-
isis. who argue that this language is best understood merely as permitting Congress to 
move certain issues between the Court's original and appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ca-
labresi & Lawson, supra note 13, at 1008; Claus. supra note 13, at 114. See also James E. 
Pfander. Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tri-
bunals. 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1441-42 (2000) (arguing that "exceptions" power might 
give Congress power to preclude the Court from hearing as-of-right cases. but it does not 
give Congress power to preclude the Court's supervisory powers, which are generally 
issued through discretionary writs. such as habeas corpus and mandamus). 
31. See generally Hart, supra note 13 (arguing that Congress must leave intact the 
"essential functions" of the Court); Ratner, supra note 13, at 201-D2 (explaining that "es-
sential functions" include "maintaining the uniformity and supremacy of federal law"). 
But see Gunther, supra note 13. at 920 (noting that the "essential functions" argument 
begs the question of what are the Court's "'essential functions" and confuses the familiar 
with the necessary): Wechsler, supra note 13, at 1005-{)6 (rejecting "essential functions" 
argument). 
32. See generally Richard H. Fallon. Jr.. Applying the Suspension Clause to Immi-
gration Cases. 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1068 (1998): Ratner. supra note 13: Sager. supra note 
13; Tribe, supra note 13. Although these commentators have spoken of the need to main-
tain a route to the Supreme Court. it may be that it would be sufficient to leave some 
federal court open. See infra Section II.B.l.b. 
33. Again. I discuss the Court's response after that of the commentators because of 
the paucity of guidance from the Court. See supra note 23. 
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power to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction.34 However, in 
repeated dicta, the Court appears to have endorsed one limit on 
this power: Congress may need to leave open some avenue by 
which certain types of cases can be litigated in federal court (and 
possibly the Supreme Court)." But the Court never actually 
struck down a law limiting its appellate jurisdiction on these 
grounds- until Boumediene. 
C. STRIPPING ALL FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
The most difficult question in the jurisdiction-stripping de-
bate is whether Congress can preclude all federal court jurisdic-
tion (other than the Supreme Court's narrow original jurisdic-
tion). Put differently, assuming that Congress can eliminate the 
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, under what circumstances, if any, can 
Congress do both of these things at the same time?36 
The support for this form of jurisdiction-stripping derives 
from the fact that, assuming Congress can eliminate lower court 
jurisdiction and Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, nothing in 
the text of the Constitution seems to preclude Congress from 
doing both of these things at once.37 This form of jurisdiction-
34. See. e.g .. Felker v. Turpin. 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (maintaining the limit on the 
Court's appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the Exceptions Clause); Ex Parte McCardle. 
74 C.S. (7 Wall.) 506. 513-14 (1869) (upholding statute that limited Court's appellate ju-
risdiction on basis of Exceptions Clause). 
35. See, e.g .. id. at 515 (noting that jurisdiction-stripping statute may have been 
more problematic if it had foreclosed all routes to the Court); Felker. at 651 (reaching the 
same conclusion as the court in McCardle). At least one Justice also appears to have pro-
vided a nod in dicta to Professor Hart's "'essential function"' limit. In a concurrence in 
Felker. Justice Souter noted that it was an "'open"' question whether Congress could use 
its Exceptions Clause power to shut down all avenues to the Court, specifically citing 
Professor Hart's articulation of an '"essential functions' limitation on the Exceptions 
Clause ... See id. at 667 (Souter. J.. concurring). But the Court as a whole has never ad-
dressed this issue. 
36. Most of the commentators in this debate have assumed that. even if Congress 
closed all federal courts. state courts would remain open. See, e.g., Meltzer. supra note 13. 
at 1627 (introducing the idea that state courts must hear cases if federal jurisdictions are 
stripped of their power to do so); Martin H. Reddish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional 
Power to Control the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a 
Ne"· Svnthesis. 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975) (explaining that Congress cannot close all 
federal courts unless state court is available); Redish. supra note 15. at 155 (arguing in 
favor of Congressional power to strip all federal jurisdiction assumes state courts or some 
other independent body available to hear cases): see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel 
J. Meltzer. New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARY. L. 
REV. 1731. 2039 (1991) (elaborating that "'some court"' must remain available). The im-
plications of this assumption will be discussed below. See infra notes 104-107 and accom-
panying text. 
37. Notably. the modern textual argument against total federal jurisdiction-
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stripping may also find support in a checks-and-balances con-
cept: The argument is that the Framers consciously provided 
these forms of power to Congress as a way to permit it to check 
the judiciary.'H 
Here, the commentators seem to be more split than on the 
prior two questions. Some have argued that Congress can prec-
lude all federal jurisdiction with few, if any, limits.'y Others have 
rejected this position, arguing that Congress must vest jurisdic-
tion in some federal court. 40 
Still others have taken the position that Congress can curtail 
federal court jurisdiction, but subject to significant limitations. 
For example, Professors Sager and Claus have suggested that 
Congress cannot selectivel~ strip jurisdiction in a manner that 
disfavors particular rights.4 Professor Amar has suggested that 
Congress cannot preclude federal courts from hearing matters 
that fall within the list of "cases" set out in Article 111.4" 
stripping attacks one of the two powers-the idea that the ··exceptions" power permits 
Congress to preclude Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. See. e.g., Calabresi & Law-
son. supra note 13. at 1008; Claus. supra note 13, at 114. This argument is not an argu-
ment against combining powers. Rather. it is an argument that one of the two purported 
powers does not exist. 
38. See, e.g., Charles Black. The Presidency and Congress. 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
841. 846 (1975) (congressional control of federal court jurisdiction "is the rock on which 
rests the legitimacy of the judicial work in a democracy"). But see Claus. supra note 13. at 
87-88 (disagreeing with Professor Black) and 88-97 (offering different account of fra-
mers' intent); Sager, supra note 13, at 38 (noting that this approach "is at odds with the 
position that Congress cannot use jurisdiction to undermine the decisions of the Supreme 
Court"). 
39. See, e.g., William R. Casto. The First Congress's Understanding of Its Authority 
over the Federal Courts' Jurisdiction. 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101 (1985): Meltzer, supra note 13. 
at 1627: Redish. supra note 15. at 155: see also Pfander. supra note 7. at 195-96 (suggest-
ing that "recent scholarship ... points to an emerging orthodox consensus" that "Con-
gress has relatively broad power over" federal courts' jurisdiction). I say "with few. if 
any.limits" because. as will be discussed below. almost all of these commentators assume 
that state courts would remain available to hear cases and might feel differently about 
Congress closing all federal courts if state courts were unavailable. See supra note 36. I 
will discuss this assumption below. See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. 
40. See, e.g., JULIUS GOEBEL. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 240-47 (1971): Clinton. supra note 
13, at 749-50; Eisenberg, supra note 13. This position actually seems to have originated in 
dicta by Justice Story. See infra note 48. 
41. See, e.g., Claus, supra note 13 at 67 (arguing that. at the very least. Congress 
must not engage in issue-specific jurisdiction-stripping): Sager. supra note 13. at 70 (Con-
gress cannot exercise its jurisdiction-stripping power in a way that disfavors particular 
constitutional rights); see also Tribe. supra note 13 (decrying jurisdictional gerrymander-
ing of lower court jurisdiction). But see Redish, supra note 15. at 143 (issue-specific juris-
diction-stripping is permissible). 
42. See generally Amar. supra note 13. But see Meltzer. supra note 13. at 1627 (disa-
greeing with Professor Amar on this point). 
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Most important for purposes of this Article is a limit pro-
posed by Professor Sager, and also by Professors Fallon and 
Meltzer: Congress cannot preclude federal courts from hearing 
constitutional claims.43 Varying justifications have been offered 
for this proposition. For example, some commentators have 
grounded this limit in the Due Process Clause.44 Professor Sager 
bases this proposition on what he terms "the constitutional 
commitment to a radically independent federal judiciary," which 
he finds in Article III's salary and tenure protections for federal 
judges.45 But the most important justification for this limit for 
purposes of understanding Boumediene is the one offered by 
Professors Fallon and Meltzer: Courts must remain available to 
adjudicate constitutional claims in order to "keep government 
generally within the bounds of law. "46 
The courts47 have seemed particularly hesitant to decide 
whether Congress can strip all federal courts of jurisdiction-at 
least until Boumediene.48 They have adopted and applied a 
43. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 36, at 1778-79; Sager, supra note 13. at 
66. But see Redish. supra note 15. at 155 (disagreeing that Congress must provide a feder-
al court to resolve constitutional claims) (emphasis added). The possibility a state court 
could serve this purpose will be discussed below. See infra notes 104-107 and accompany-
ing text. 
44. See, e.g., Redish, supra 15. at 158-59 (explaining that the Due Process clause 
requires that court be available to hear all claims involving deprivations of life. liberty. or 
property). But see id. at 155 (that court need not be a federal court; it could be a state 
court). Notably. the Due Process argument would protect jurisdiction over only a subset 
of constitutional claims: those involving life, liberty, or property. Unless "liberty" were 
seen as co-extensive with all constitutional rights, this theory would not require federal 
jurisdiction over all constitutional claims. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 503 (ex-
plaining that most. but not all. of the Bill of Rights have been considered "liberty" inter-
ests for purposes of incorporating them against states). A more modest variation on the 
principle that Congress must leave open a federal court in all constitutional cases or all 
Due Process Clause cases is the idea that a federal court must remain available to hear 
claims of a constitutional right to process. See Hart. supra note 13, at 1372. 
45. See, e.g., Sager. supra note 13, at 65. 
46. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 43. at 1778-79; see also Claus. supra note 13, at 
64 (noting separation of powers issues inherent in an expansive reading of the Exceptions 
Clause). I say that this is the most important argument for our purposes because, as we 
will see below. it seems to be the argument that animated the Boumediene court. See in-
fra Part II.B. As Professor Redish has pointed out, this "keeping the government in 
check" argument is not necessarily limited to constitutional claims; it might apply to non-
constitutional claims. as well. See Redish, supra note 15, at 148, 152. Professor Redish's 
observation in this regard will be explored further below, in note 102. 
47. Once again. I discuss the courts' position last because of the paucity of judicial 
guidance in this area. See supra note 23. 
48. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question, two circuit courts 
appear to have reached it, though the guidance these opinions provide is not entirely 
clear. First, in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., the Second Circuit adopted the position 
that the Due Process Clause precludes stripping all federal jurisdiction in cases that in-
volve the deprivation of property. See 169 F.2d 254. 257 (2d Cir. 1948). It is notable that 
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strong avoidance doctrine, under which they have interpreted 
statutes so as to avoid concluding that Congress has sought to 
strip federal courts of all jurisdiction (thus avoiding the constitu-
tional question of whether Congress can do so). In fact, in a 
number of cases, the Supreme Court appears to go to great-
some might say extreme -lengths to find that Congress did not 
intend to preclude all federal jurisdiction.49 For example, in INS 
v. St. Cyr, the Court addressed a statute that said, "Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdic-
tion to review any final order of removal" of a deportable alien."' 
Yet the court held that the words "judicial review" did not in-
clude habeas corpus; that habeas review remained available. 51 In 
dissent, Justice Scalia accused the majority of finding "ambiguity 
in utterly clear" language and "fabricat[ing] a superclear state-
the Supreme Court never got involved in this case. But. as discussed below in the text. 
later Supreme Court dicta appears to endorse a variation of Bauagfia's holding: the idea 
that Congress cannot strip all jurisdiction in constitutional cases. Second. in Eisenlrager v. 
Forreslal. the D.C. Circuit held that the Suspension Clause precludes stripping all federal 
jurisdiction in a habeas case. See 174 F.2d 961. 966 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1949). However. this 
opinion was reversed on the ground that the Suspension Clause did not apply to German 
nationals held in Germany. See Johnson v. Eisentrager 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (a holding 
discussed at length and ultimately distinguished in Boumediene). So the Supreme Court 
did not address the issue in that case. 
One Supreme Court Justice has addressed the issue. albeit in dicta. Justice Story as-
serted that Congress could not preclude all federal jurisdiction in any case listed in Ar-
ticle III. whether it involved a constitutional claim or non-constitutional claim. See Mar-
tin v. Hunter's Lessee. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304. 328-31 (1816). However. no later 
Supreme Court opinion appears to adopt-or even repeat-this assertion. (It was cited 
as an alternative ground by the D.C. Circuit in Eisemrager. See 174 F.2d at 966 n.26. rev 'd 
339 U.S. 763. But beyond that. Justice Story's assertion does not appear to have gained 
much traction in the courts.) 
49. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (interpreting DTA as being 
non-retroactive. and thus permitting review in pending cases): Rasul v. Bush. 542 U.S. 
466 (2004) (interpreting general habeas statute to permit habeas review of claims by 
aliens outside the United States): INS v. St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that. in 
precluding judicial review of immigration claims. Congress did not intend to preclude 
review of habeas jurisdiction): Felker v. Turpin. 518 U.S. 651. 661 (1996) (holding that 
Congress did not preclude all judicial review. since original habeas jurisdiction remained 
available): Webster v. Doe. 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (holding that Congressional preclusion of 
judicial review did not include preclusion of judicial review of constitutional claims): Bo-
wen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians. 476 U.S. 667. 681 n.12 (1986) (articulating a 
similar holding to that in Websler): Johnson v. Robison. 415 U.S. 361.366--67 (1974) (ex-
plaining that jurisdiction-stripping statute did not prevent judicial review of constitution-
al claims): see also Pfander. supra note 7. at 195 (noting that "the Court [has] adopted 
strained readings of restrictions on is appellate jurisdiction ... to avoid the constitutional 
question that would arise from [such] legislation"): Ernest A. Young. Conslilllfional 
Avoidance, Resislance Norms, and lhe Preservalion of Judicial Review. 78 TEX. L. REV. 
1549 (2000) (discussing Court's use of avoidance doctrines to resist jurisdiction-
stripping). 
50. 533 U.S. at 299. 
51. See id. at 299-300. 
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ment, 'magic words' requirement ... unparalleled in any other 
area of our jurisprudence. '' 52 
I will discuss the merits of the Court's avoidance doctrine 
below.'' But whatever one thinks of the merits of the Court's 
avoidance doctrine, there are two things that are worth noting 
about it. First, as a result of that doctrine, the Court has pro-
vided little solid guidance on the question of whether Congress 
can preclude all federal jurisdiction. Second, despite the lack of 
solid guidance, we do find some limited guidance in the Court's 
explanations for why it has worked so hard to avoid addressing 
this question. Specifically, the Court's has suggested some sym-
pathy-in a vague way-for the position that there may be some 
limits on Congress's ability to strip all federal jurisdiction in con-
stitutional cases.'~ 
The Court has repeatedly explained its inclination to avoid 
the question of jurisdiction-stripping in the form of a warning-
albeit in dicta-to Congress: If Congress really did intend to 
preclude all jurisdiction over constitutional claims, the Court ex-
plains, this ''would give rise to substantial constitutional ques-
tions.""' In other words, the Court seems to be suggesting that, 
while it believes Congress has substantial control over federal 
jurisdiction, the Court might draw the line at total federal juris-
diction-stripping in constitutional cases. 
So far, this warning has been relatively vague; the Court has 
not explained the "constitutional questions" that would arise 
from total federal jurisdiction-stripping in such cases. And so far, 
52. See id. at 326-27 (Scalia. J .. dissenting). 
53. See infra Part Ill. 
54. This vague warning might arguably represent the Court's attempt to open of a 
.. dialogue .. with Congress or with the people over the constitutional permissibility of ju-
risdiction-stripping. See Barry Friedman. Dialogue and Judicial Review. 91 MICH. L. REV. 
577. 668-69 (1993) (discussing role of Court in focusing and promoting dialogue over 
constitutional meaning): Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Speaking in a Judicial Voice. 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1185. 1198 (1992) (explaining the judicial branch's dialogue with the other 
branches of government). 
)). See St. Cvr. 533 U.S. at 300: see also Webster. 486 U.S at 603 Uustifying heigh-
tened intent requi~ement as means of avoiding the ... serious constitutional question· that 
would arise if~ federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable 
constitutional claim .. ) (citation omitted): Bowen. 476 U.S. at 681 n.12 (choosing to avoid 
the .. serious constitutional question" ): Johnson. 415 U.S. at 366-D7 (articulating that the 
Court must ascertain whether a construction of the statute is possible which avoids the 
constitutional question). The Court has also offered similar dicta outside of the context 
of its avoidance doctrine. See Zadvydas v. Davis. 533 U.S. 678. 692 (2001) ("This Court 
has suggested ... that the Constitution may well preclude granting an administrative 
bodv the unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental 
rights .. ) (citing St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289). 
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the Court's endorsement has been limited to dicta. This all 
changed in Boumediene. 
II. BOUMEDIENE'S ANSWERS 
This Part will show how Boumediene suggests at least a par-
tial resolution of the jurisdiction-stripping debate. Section A will 
explain the Boumediene opinion on its own terms-that is, as a case 
about the habeas rights of non-citizens held abroad. Section B will 
show how the Court's responses to the habeas issues before it 
suggest answers to the three questions in the jurisdiction-
stripping debate. Section C will then show how these answers 
apply to all jurisdiction-stripping cases, not just to habeas cases. 
A. BOUMED/ENE ON ITS OWN TERMS 
On its face, Boumediene is a case about the habeas corpus 
rights of non-citizens detained abroad by the United States gov-
ernment. The case arose in the context of the war on terror. As 
part of that effort, the Bush Administration had captured and 
detained a number of individuals, claiming that they were "ene-
my combatants." The President had claimed that he had the 
power to hold such "enemy combatants" for the duration of the 
war on terror-perhaps indefinitely.56 Several of the detainees 
challenged this claim. Others, including the petitioners in Bou-
mediene, claimed that the government made a factual error; that 
they were not "enemy combatants." Several such challenges, in-
cluding the one in Boumediene, were made by petitioning the 
federal courts for writs of habeas corpus; that is, for an order to 
release the petitioners on the ground that their detentions are 
illegal. 
To deal with the possibility of habeas claims, the Bush Ad-
ministration divided the detainees into two groups, depending 
on their citizenship status and location. This is because the de-
tainees' right to seek habeas was thought to depend on these two 
criteria. U.S. citizens and those detained on U.S. soil are general-
ly thought to have a right to seek habeas.'7 But the Administra-
56. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
57. While President Bush seemed to concede that Americans or those held on 
American soil had a right to habeas. he did not concede that the federal courts should 
hear their cases. Rather. the President claimed that Constitution gave him exclusive or 
nearly-exclusive power to decide how to prosecute an armed conflict. and that this execu-
tive power overrides or limits citizen-detainees' right to seek habeas relief from the 
courts-a claim that the Court rejected in 2004 in Hamdi. See 542 U.S. 507. 
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tion contended that non-citizens detained abroad did not have 
that right. Accordingly, the Administration had detained anum-
ber of non-citizens in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and claimed that 
the courts cannot entertain habeas petitions by these detainees. 
The initial fight over the habeas rights of non-citizens held 
in Guantanamo was a statutory fight. In Rasul v. Bush, the Court 
held that non-citizens detained in Guantanamo Bay had a statu-
tory right to seek habeas relief under the general habeas statute, 
28 U.S.C. Section 2241.58 Congress responded with the Detainee 
Treatment Act (DTA), which amended Section 2241 to preclude 
statutory habeas claims by non-citizens designated as "enemy 
combatants."59 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that the 
DT A did not apply retroactively; that non-citizen detainees who 
had already filed habeas petitions under Section 2241 could con-
tinue to pursue those claims.60 Once again, Congress responded, 
this time with the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), 
which made clear that the DTA was intended to be retroactive.61 
This effectively precluded all avenues of statutory habeas juris-
diction for non-citizens held in Guantanamo.62 
In Boumediene, a group of non-citizen detainees in Guanta-
namo Bay claimed a constitutional right to habeas. The detai-
nees claimed that, irrespective of any statute, the Suspension 
Clause of the Constitution-which precludes Congress from sus-
pending the writ of habeas corpus except in cases of rebellion or 
invasion63 -provides them with a constitutional right to petition 
a court for a writ of habeas corpus. 
The government's first defense was that the Suspension 
Clause does not apply to non-citizens held outside of the U.S. in 
a place such as Guantanamo.64 Specifically, the government ar-
58. See Rasul v. Bush. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
59. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). 
60. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). 
62. I say "effectively precluded" because, in Boumediene, the detainees tried to 
claim that the MCA's retroactivity provisions were not intended to apply to habeas 
claims (a distinction similar to the one adopted by the Court in St. Cyr, see 533 U.S. at 
299-300). However. in Boumediene, the Court swiftly rejected this claim. See Boume-
diene. at 2242-44. 
63. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9. In this case, Congress did not try to suspend the writ. 
But see Jonathan Alter. Keeping Order in the Courts, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 48 
("When Attorney General John Ashcroft sent the secret first draft of the antiterrorism 
bill to Capitol Hill in October [2001]. it contained a section explicitly titled: 'Suspension 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus."'). For an interesting discussion of whether Congress 
could do so. see Amanda Tyler. Suspension as an Emergency Power. 118 Yale L.J. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
64. See Boumediene. at 2244. 
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gued (1) that the lease agreement between the U.S. and Cuba 
regarding the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station makes Cuba sove-
reign over that location, and (2) that the Suspension Clause does 
not apply in places where another country maintains sovereign-
ty; a sovereignty-based test.65 The Court accepted the govern-
ment's first contention (that Cuba maintained sovereignty over 
Guantanamo ).66 But it rejected the government's second conten-
tion, holding for the first time that the Suspension Clause-and 
therefore a constitutional right to habeas- applies to certain 
non-citizens held abroad. 67 Specifically, it held that the Clause 
applied in Guantanamo.68 
The Court based this holding primarily on an argument 
about separation of powers.69 The Court noted that the govern-
ment's proposed sovereignty-based test would essentially permit 
the government to "switch the Constitution on or off at will" 
based on the agreements it might enter with host countries.70 
This, the Court held, would violate the concept of separation of 
powers: "The test for determining the scope of [the Suspension 
Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose 
power it is designed to restrain."71 Rather, the Court held, the 
scope of the Suspension Clause must be determined by the 
courts: The courts, not the political branches, are supposed to 
say "what the law is. "72 
Then, having rejected the government's proposed sove-
reignty-based test for determining the where the Suspension 
Clause applies, the Court looked at its precedents to derive an 
65. See id. at 2252. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. at 2262. At least one commentator has argued that the constitutional 
right to habeas derives from Article IlL not the Suspension Clause. See Claus. supra note 
13. at 109-113. However. the Boumediene Court seemed to assume that the constitution-
al right to habeas was implied by the Suspension Clause. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 
2262. 
68. See id. 
69. The Court's opinion also contains a lengthy examination of the history of ha-
beas corpus both prior and subsequent to the Founding. See id. at 2244-51. However. at 
the end of this discussion, the Court concludes that this history is non-dispositive. See id. 
at 2249, 2251. Notably. what the Court does glean from this discussion is the notion that. 
as a historical matter. the writ has largely been understood as a mechanism for separating 
powers-a way for courts to check the excesses of the executive. See id. at 2246. 2247. 
Additionally. as discussed in the text below. the Court relied on precedent to frame its 
test for the places in which the Suspension Clause would apply to non-citizens. However. 
this discussion occurred only after the Court had rejected the government's proposed 
sovereignty-based test. 
70. See id. at 2259. 
71. Seeid. 
72. See id. 
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alternative test. 73 In applying that test, the Court concluded that 
Guantanamo was the type of place in which the Suspension 
Clause applied. 74 
The government also advanced the alternative argument 
that, even if the Suspension Clause did apply to non-citizens at 
Guantanamo, the procedures provided by the DT A serve as an 
adequate substitute for the writ.75 The DT A provides two stages 
of review: First, a detainee gets a hearing in front of a Comba-
tant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), established by the Defense 
Department.76 Then, the detainee can challenge the CSRT's de-
termination in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia.77 
The Court held that this procedure did not provide an ade-
quate substitute for habeas. It began by noting that "the neces-
sary scope of habeas review [or a proposed substitute for habeas] 
in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceedings. "78 The 
Court then noted several shortcomings in the earlier CSRT pro-
cedures. including the fact that detainees do not have the assis-
tance of counsel, have limited means to find and present evi-
dence that they are not enemy combatants, and may not even be 
aware of the most critical allegations relied upon by the govern-
ment.79 The Court remarked that these shortcomings posed a 
"considerable risk of error," and held that "the court that con-
ducts the habeas proceeding [or its substitute] must have the 
means to correct errors that occurred during the CSRT proceed-
ings. ,HI, The Court then noted several limitations that the DT A 
places upon the D.C. Circuit's ability to correct such errors, in-
cludini the court's inability to consider newly discovered evi-
dence. 1 As a result of these limitations, the Court held that the 
DT A did not provide an adequate substitute for habeas.82 
Because the Suspension Clause applied and because Con-
gress had neither sought to suspend the writ nor provided an 
adequate substitute for the writ, the Court held in favor of the 
73. See id. at 2259. 
7 4. See id. at 2262. 
75. See id. at 2262. 
76. See id. at 2241. 
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). 
78. See Boumediene. at 2268. 
79. See id. at 2269. 
80. See id. at 2270. 
81. See id. at 2272. 
82. See id. at 2274. 
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detainees. It ordered the lower courts to hear habeas cases 
brought by such detainees.H1 
B. BOUMEDIENE AS A JURISDICTION-STRIPPING CASE 
As discussed above, Boumediene was a habeas case. Though 
habeas-stripping may conceptually be understood as a subset of 
jurisdiction-stripping, the Court did not characterize the case as 
a jurisdiction-stripping case. Rather, the Court addressed the 
case as a habeas case. However, as this Section will demonstrate, 
the principles the Court used to decide Boumediene effectively 
provide answers to the jurisdiction-stripping debate. 
This Section will show how Boumediene suggests a critical 
limit on Congress's power to curtail federal court jurisdiction: 
Congress cannot strip all jurisdiction over constitutional ques-
tions. The Section will then look at the two sub-powers that ar-
guably give Congress the power to restrict federal court jurisdic-
tion, the "ordain and establish" power to limit lower court 
jurisdiction and the "exceptions and regulations" power to limit 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. The Section will show how 
Boumediene may limit those two sub-powers, in addition to li-
miting Congress's ability to exercise those powers simultaneous-
ly. Then, in the following Section, I will demonstrate that these 
limits are not limited to habeas cases; that they apply to all juris-
diction-stripping cases. 
1. Preventing Stripping of All Federal Jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the most significant development in Boumediene is 
that it effectively answers the question of whether Congress can 
strip jurisdiction from all federal courts. Boumediene effectively 
says that Congress cannot do so, at least in cases involving con-
stitutional questions.84 
I am not claiming that the Boumediene majority necessarily 
saw itself as deciding this jurisdiction-stripping question. Rather, 
my point is that the Boumediene Court employed three powerful 
principles to decide whether the Suspension Clause extended to 
Guantanamo, and that those principles can be applied to-and 
largely resolve-the question of whether Congress can preclude 
all federal court jurisdiction. 
83. See id. at 2279. 
84. A caveat to this principle where state courts may be available will be discussed 
below. See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. 
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a. Boumediene's Three Principles. 
Recall that the government had requested a sovereignty-
based test to determine the reach of the Suspension Clause. And 
recall that the Court rejected that proposed test on the ground 
that the test would violate separation of powers principles. Spe-
cifically, Boumediene's separation of powers argument contained 
three principles. 
First, the Court said that the political branches cannot set 
their own boundaries. The Court could not abide the prospect 
that "the political branches have the power to switch the Consti-
tution on and off at will. "85 In other words, someone other than 
those branches must define the limits of those branches' power. 
This can be thought of as the external limit principle.86 
Second, the Court said that the Courts must be the ones to 
define the limits on the political branches' power. The problem 
that the Court had with the prospect of the political branches 
having the ability to "switch the Constitution on or off" was that 
such power "would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite 
system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress 
and the President, not this Court, say 'what the law is."'87 In oth-
er words, the Court said, the courts, not the political branches, 
must define the Constitution's limits on the political branches' 
power- must say "what the law is." This can be thought of as the 
judicial enforcement principle. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the jurisdiction-
stripping debate, the Court balked at the idea that the political 
branches could manipulate the courts' ability to perform this 
function: "The test for determining the scope of [the Suspension 
Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose 
85. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
86. See Claus. supra note 13. at 64. 119-20 (noting separation of powers problem 
with jurisdiction-stripping: "For three centuries, Western political thought has recognized 
the evil in letting any government actor conclusively determine the reach of its own pow-
ers."). 
87. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
2009] BOUMEDIENE AND THE IMPERIAL COURT 397 
power it is designed to constrain."K8 This can be thought of as the 
anti-manipulation principle.89 
Although Boumediene deployed these three principles to 
address a controversy over the territorial scope of the Suspen-
sion Clause, these three principles have important implications 
for the jurisdiction-stripping debate. 
The first two principles (the external limit principle and the 
judicial enforcement principle) are powerful arguments for judi-
cial review of the political branches' acts. In fact, these principles 
were central to Chief Justice Marshall's famous justification for 
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison-which Boumediene cites 
prominently.90 If there were no judicial review, Marshall rea-
soned, then the political branches would effectivelX have unli-
mited power-contrary to the Constitution's design. 1 It is essen-
tially an argument that (1) lack of oversight effectively means 
lack of constraint (the external limit principle), and (2) that the 
courts' role is to provide that oversight (the judicial enforcement 
principle). 
For example, suppose that the President were given the fi-
nal decision on how much process the Due Process Clause re-
quired. He might decide that this clause required no process at 
all, or no process beyond the "right" to respond during interro-
gation.92 He could thereby detain people indefinitely without any 
hearing. Or suppose that Congress were given the final decision 
on the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Congress could 
88. See id. This principle appears to have been suggested by a single Justice in 1950. 
See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763.795 (1950) (Black, J .. dissenting) ("The Court is 
fashioning wholly indefensible doctrine if it permits the executive branch. by deciding 
where its prisoners will be tried and imprisoned, to deprive all federal courts of their 
power to protect against a federal executive's illegal incarcerations."). But this principle 
does not seem to have been adopted by the Court until Boumediene. 
89. Note that this principle is slightly different than the one suggested by Professors 
Sager, Tribe, and Claus, supra note 41. These commentators were concerned with Con-
gress manipulating jurisdiction as a way to favor or disfavor particular rights. See, e.g., 
Sager. supra note 13, at 70 (contending that Congress cannot exercise its jurisdiction-
stripping power in a way that disfavors particular constitutional rights); Tribe, supra note 
13 (decrying jurisdictional gerrymandering); see also Claus. supra note 13 at 67 (arguing 
that. at the very least. Congress must not engage in issue-specific jurisdiction-stripping). 
Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle seems broader. The concern is not that Con-
gress may manipulate jurisdiction to favor or disfavor particular rights: it is that Congress 
may try to manipulate jurisdiction to evade review of its (or the President's) conduct-
irrespective of which right it might be infringing. 
90. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
91. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
92. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,537 (2004) (highlighting the government's 
argument that it provided process by permitting a prisoner to contest his status as an 
"enemy combatant" during interrogation). 
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decide that this clause only protected the slaves freed during the 
Civil War, and thereby pass laws denying modern-day African 
Americans or Catholics the right to own property. The correct-
ness of these interpretations is not the issue. The issue is who 
gets to interpret the Constitution. The point of Marshall's argu-
ment. echoed in Boumediene's first two separation of powers 
principles, was that someone other than the political branches-
specifically, the judiciary-must be the arbiter of the Constitu-
tion's limits on those branches.93 
While these two principles have traditionally been deployed 
in support of the power of judicial review, they also have impli-
cations for the jurisdiction-stripping debate. The argument is 
that these principles not only permit judicial review (as Marbury 
held), they require judicial review, at least in constitutional cas-
es: If Congress could preclude judicial review, it would be able to 
shed the very constraints that Marbury said were necessary to 
keep the political branches in check. Thus, the argument goes, 
courts must remain available to adjudicate constitutional claims 
in order to "keep government generally within the bounds of 
I ,44 aw. 
Readers might balk at these two principles, whether applied 
to judicial review or jurisdiction-stripping. As most first year law 
students learn in their study of Marbury, despite Chief Justice 
Marshall's assertion, it is far from clear that absent judicial re-
view the political branches would ignore the Constitution (the 
external limit principle). Those elected to the political branches 
take a similar oath to the one judges take to act within the 
bounds of the Constitution.95 Whether they would keep them-
selves in check absent external oversight is arguably an open 
question.% Also, even if one accepted the external limit principle, 
it would seem to be an open question whether there are other 
effective forms of oversight besides judicial review (the judicial 
enforcement principle). For example, the electorate might vote a 
93. Actually. Marbury did not necessarily establish that the courts must always get 
the last word regarding the constitutionality of the political branches' actions. Read nar-
rowly. that opinion might be understood as standing only for the proposition that the 
courts get to evaluate constitutionality; not that they get the last word on the issue. See 
Marburv. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. However. in later cases. the Court asserted that it gets 
the last 'word on constitutionality. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
94. See Fallon & Meltzer. supra note 43. at 1778-79. 
95. See. e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IL § L cl. 8. But see Paul A. Diller. When Congress 
Passes an lntentionallv Unconstitutional Law: The Military Commissions Act Of 2006. 61 
SMU L. REV. 281 (2008) (arguing that Congress passed- the MCA knowing that it was 
unconstitutional and would be struck down by the Court). 
96. See CHEMERINSKY. supra note 7. at 44. 
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politician out of office for acting outside the bounds of the Con-
stitution.97 Maybe courts are not necessary to keep the political 
branches in check. And, of course, there is also the question of 
who will provide a check on the courts.9H 
But my purpose here is not to debate whether these two 
principles-when made by the Marbury Court or the Boume-
diene Court-are correct. My point is that the Boumediene 
Court has adopted these two principles in a context that supports 
their application to the jurisdiction-stripping debate. 
Prior to Boumediene, these principles had been applied to 
establish the power of judicial review. But they had never been 
deployed by the Court to address the power of Congress to cur-
tail judicial review.99 Although Boumediene was not on its face a 
jurisdiction-stripping case, the Court applied these principles in a 
way that had the effect of requiring jurisdiction in a case in 
which Congress had tried to restrict it. Congress had said that 
only the D.C. Circuit could hear the case and simultaneously li-
mited the ability of that court to do so. Based on the two Mar-
bury principles, the Boumediene Court held that Congress could 
not impose such a limit. Boumediene's use of these two prin-
ciples to ensure jurisdiction strengthens the argument that these 
principles preclude complete jurisdiction-stripping in constitu-
tional cases. 
But an additional argument against jurisdiction-stripping 
flows from Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle (that the 
political branches may not manipulate the scope of the Constitu-
tion's limits on their own power). This principle, which the Court 
had not clearly articulated before,](KJ suggests that Congress can-
not strip jurisdiction where doing so serves to shield Congress or 
the President from judicial review in constitutional cases, giving 
97. See id. 
98. After Marbury. one possible answer to this question was that Congress could do 
so. through its jurisdiction-stripping power. Boumediene appears largely to foreclose this 
option without providing an alternative means of limiting the courts. Whether this is a 
good idea is discussed more fully below in Part III. 
99. As noted above. the Court did occasionally talk about the "'separation of pow-
ers"" problems that might arise if Congress were to preclude all jurisdiction over constitu-
tional claims. See supra Section I.C. However. as also noted above. the Court never dis-
cussed what those "'separation of powers"' problems were. and never struck down a 
jurisdiction-stripping or jurisdiction-restricting law based on these principles- until 
Boumediene. See id. 
100. While it is far from clear. one might read United States v. Klein as standing for 
the proposition that Congress cannot manipulate federal court jurisdiction in a manner 
designed to achieve specific outcomes in litigation. See SO U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871 ). 
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the political branches the last word on the constitutionality of 
their own actions. 101 
To understand this point, consider again the hypotheticals 
set forth above. In those hypotheticals, the President asserted 
that the Due Process Clause did not preclude him from detaining 
people without trial, and Congress asserted that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause did not preclude it from preventing African 
Americans or Catholics from owning property. Exercising the 
power of judicial review, the courts would almost certainly reach 
different conclusions about the meaning of these two clauses. 
But now suppose that Congress passed a law stripping jurisdic-
tion from the courts to hear cases involving the Due Process 
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. Effectively, such a law 
would manipulate the limits on the political branches. It would 
permit those branches, and not the judiciary, to determine the 
Constitution's limits on their actions- that is, to "say what the 
law is." Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle seems to prec-
lude such a tactic. 
Thus, the three separation of powers principles deployed in 
Boumediene appear to resolve, at least in part, the question of 
complete jurisdiction-stripping. These three principles suggest 
that Congress cannot preclude all jurisdiction in constitutional 
102 
cases. 
101. Below. I will discuss the potential meanings of the anti-manipulation principle. 
as well as how this principle can be reconciled with Ex Parte McCardle's famous pro-
nouncement that Congress's intent is irrelevant in jurisdiction-stripping cases. 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 506. 515 (1869). See infra text accompanying notes 112-117. For now, I state the 
principle generically. 
102. One might wonder whether Boumediene's requirement for a federal court to 
remain open applies only in constitutional cases, or whether a court must also be availa-
ble to hear claims of statutory violations as well. See HART & WECHSLER. supra note 10. 
at 352 (posing question of whether constitution requires review over "suits alleging that 
official action has violated statutory. rather than constitutional. rights''): Richard H. Fal-
lon. Jr.. Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III. 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 915. 976--86 (1988) (advocating for the need of judicial review of legislative and 
administrative actions). If courts are required to keep the federal government within the 
bounds of its authority. this requirement would seem to apply to statutory, as well as con-
stitutional authority. See Redish. supra note 15, at 148. 152. And this is a constitutional 
principle-the type that would arguably trump Congress's Article III jurisdiction-
stripping powers. The Constitution requires the federal government to remain within its 
bounds. When it acts within the power granted by a legitimate statute, it acts within its 
bounds. When it exceeds such power. it acts outside of those bounds. Given the Boume-
diene Court's concern about unlimited government-and the need for courts to prevent 
unlimited government-it might well be concerned with action that exceeds statutory. as 
well as constitutional. bounds. 
The separation of powers argument against jurisdiction-stripping in statutory cases is 
arguably hampered by the argument that many statutory claims do not really involve the 
unconstrained exercise of federal power. Specifically, when a statute provides an agency 
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b. Potential Limits on Boumediene's Principles. 
There are two-possibly three-important limits on my ar-
gument that Boumediene should be read as grecluding complete 
jurisdiction-stripping in constitutional cases. 3 First, Boumediene 
does not necessarily preclude Congress from stripping all federal 
jurisdiction in constitutional cases-at least in cases where state 
courts (1) remain open, and (2) are capable of keeping the fed-
eral political branches in check.104 Recall that Boumediene's 
second principle (the judicial enforcement principle) requires a 
court to keep the political branches of the federal government in 
check. In Boumediene, which involved a habeas claim against the 
federal government, only a federal court could provide such a 
check. This is because, under Tarble's Case, a state court cannot 
grant habeas petitions against the federal government. 105 Howev-
er, it remains possible that, in other types of cases, a state court 
might be capable of serving as a check against the federal politi-
with discretion to act within a certain range. it will be impossible to argue that the agency 
is acting in an unconstrained fashion as long as it is acting within the range of its discre-
tion. But this is really just a way of saying that. in such a case. there is no statutory viola-
tion. That is, in such a case the agency would be acting within its power under the statute. 
as opposed to in violation of the statute. If the claim was that the agency exceeded the 
discretion provided by the statute. such a statutory claim would again raise the specter of 
unconstrained federal action. 
103. I do not include in this discussion the possibility that my argument regarding the 
implications of Boumediene's three principles might be limited to habeas claims. That 
argument is discussed-and rejected-below in Section II.C. 
Nor do I consider seriously the possibility that Boumediene was concerned only with 
the geographic scope of constitutional limits (where the Constitution applies). as opposed 
to the doctrinal scope of those limits (what the Constitution means). This possibility 
would not give sufficient weight to all of the Boumediene Court's concerns. Although the 
Court was clearly concerned with whether the Constitution applied in Guantanamo. the 
reason for this concern was more substantive than geographic. The Court's point was that 
the political branches should not be allowed to define their own limits; that if they could, 
they would effectively be unrestrained. Yet the concern about lack of restraint is not just 
a geographic concern. It is hard to imagine that the Court would be concerned with an 
unrestrained exercise of power in Guantanamo, but not be concerned with such an unre-
strained exercise of power in the U.S. 
104. There has been a long-running debate about the role of state courts in the juris-
diction-stripping debate. Many proponents of jurisdiction-stripping have assumed that 
state courts would remain available. or even argued that it is the availability of state 
courts that permits Congress to strip jurisdiction from federal courts. See supra notes 15. 
27. and 36. 
A sub-part of this debate has included the question of whether state courts have the 
institutional competence or insulation to keep state governments within the bounds of the 
Constitution. See supra notes 39--43. However. Boumediene does not speak to that issue. 
It only addresses the need for courts to keep the federal government within the bounds of 
the Constitution. 
105. See In re Tarble 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871). Tarb/e "has been much criti-
cized." See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 356. But it also seems fairly well en-
trenched as precedent. 
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cal branches. w<> In such cases, Boumediene's second principle 
would be satisfied by the existence of a state court. That is, if 
there are cases in which state courts could check the federal gov-
ernment, Congress could strip jurisdiction from all federal courts 
in such cases so long as it left state courts in place. 107 
A second limitation on my argument is that it does not nec-
essarily require a court to hear every constitutional case; it mere-
ly requires that the judiciary, as opposed to Congress, determine 
which constitutional cases do not need to be heard by a court. It 
is highly unlikely that Boumediene would require courts to hear 
all constitutional cases. Such a requirement would be monumen-
taL overturning hundreds of years of precedent in which the 
Court has tolerated-in fact, sanctioned-the absence of judicial 
review in constitutional cases in certain areas. For example, the 
courts routinely demur to the political branches in cases involv-
ing "political questions" or other justiciability issues, in cases in-
volvin~ immunity, and in cases involving conduct in a "theater of 
war.,!( Yet, the Boumediene Court seemed unconcerned about 
106. The Madisonian compromise almost certainly envisioned the possibility that 
state courts might keep the federal government in check. The whole idea was that Con-
gress might choose not create lower federal courts. instead leaving it to state courts (pos-
sibly with appellate review in the U.S. Supreme Court) to resolve constitutional claims. 
See Redish. supra note 15. at 155. However. subsequent developments appear to make 
this concept less likely. See, e.g., M'Clung v. Sillman. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821) (state 
courts cannot compel performance by federal officers). But see Sager. supra note 13. at 
82 (suggesting that Congress can waive this principle to permit state courts to check the 
federal government. and might be required to do so in cases where it sought to preclude 
federal jurisdiction). In any event. the question of whether state courts could effectively 
check the federal government is beyond the scope of this Article. My point is only that if 
state courts could do so. then Boumediene would appear to permit Congress to strip ju-
risdiction from federal courts to hear constitutional claims if it left state courts open. 
107. It is also arguable that a non-Article III federal court might suffice. See HART & 
WECHSLER. supra note 10. at 362-418 (discussing role of non-Article III federal courts). 
However. given the Boumediene Court's insistence on disinterest and independence, see 
128 S. Ct. at 2269. it would likely be quite skeptical of an organ of the political branches 
serving as the only check on the political branches. See also Zadvydas v. Davis. 533 U.S. 
678. 692 (2001) ("This Court has suggested ... that the Constitution may well preclude 
granting an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determinations im-
plicating fundamental rights") (citing St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289 (2001)). For an interesting 
discussion of how Article I courts may implicate jurisdiction-stripping. see Pfander, supra 
note 13. 
108. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 635 (1952) 
(Jackson. J.. concurring) (suggesting that Court would defer to President on issues occur-
ring within a "theater of war"): CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7. at 49 et seq. (discussing 
justiciability doctrines-including standing requirement. ripeness and mootness doc-
trines. prohibition on advisory opinions, and political question doctrine-as limits on 
federal jurisdiction): id. at 180 et seq. (discussing sovereign immunity as a limit on federal 
jurisdiction): see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 347-351 (suggesting that po-
litical question doctrine. sovereign immunity, and limits on remedies, may effectively 
preclude review in certain types of cases): Fallon. supra note 13, at 329-39. 366--72 (dis-
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these doctrines precluding judicial review in constitutional cases, 
and even seemed to endorse one of those doctrines (the "theater 
of war" doctrine ).109 
Boumediene's apparent comfort with the preclusion of ju-
risdiction in certain constitutional cases seems to hinge on who is 
doing the precluding. Doctrines such as justiciability, immunity, 
and the theater-of-war doctrine were created, or at least en-
dorsed, by the judiciary.110 More importantly, the boundaries of 
these doctrines are defined by the judiciary. Thus, what seems to 
distinguish acceptable jurisdiction-limiting doctrines (such as jus-
ticiability, immunity, or the theater-of-war doctrine) from unac-
ceptable jurisdiction-stripping is whether the doctrine- and 
more importantly, the limit of the doctrine-is defined by the 
judiciary. Put differently, Boumediene may stand less for the 
proposition that a court must always be available to hear consti-
tutional cases, and more for the proposition that the judiciary-
not Congress-gets to say when a court need not be available to 
hear such cases. 
This distinction can be understood in terms of Boumediene's 
three principles. The idea that there may be areas in which 
courts need not decide constitutional cases represents an implicit 
understanding that there are, in fact, exceptions to Boumediene's 
first two principles (the external review principle and the judicial 
enforcement principle). That is, in some cases, the Constitution 
may well give the political branches the last word on constitu-
tional issues. Yet-and this is the key-Boumediene's third (an-
ti-manipulation) principle determines who gets to define those 
exceptions: the judiciary, not the political branches. 111 
The importance of Boumediene's anti-manipulation prin-
ciple may suggest a third potential limit on my argument: Con-
gress might be free to strip jurisdiction -even in constitutional 
cussing well-accepted limits on judicial review). For an interesting discussion of whether 
a Congressional attempt to suspend the writ would present a political question (and con-
cluding it would not). see Amanda L. Tyler. Is Suspension a Political Question?. 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 333 (2006); see also id. at 334 (noting that three sitting Justices have suggested 
that such a statute would present a political question). 
109. See Boumediene. at 2261--()2 (appearing to endorse "theater of war .. doctrine). 
110. I include the caveat because one could see the immunity or the theater-of-war 
doctrines as originating in the executive branch. as opposed to the Court. My point. how-
ever. is that irrespective of where the idea originated. the Court has endorsed the doc-
trine. and more importantly defines its boundaries. 
111. Arguably. Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle would permit Congress (as 
well as the judiciary) to define the limits of judicial review. so long as Congress did not do 
so based upon an intent to manipulate. This possibility will be discussed in the text be-
low. 
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cases-so long as it does not do so as a form of manipulation. To 
the extent that Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle is criti-
cal to my argument against jurisdiction-stripping (a condition 
that certainly seems to be implicated by my discussion above, 
distinguishing acceptable jurisdiction-limiting doctrines from un-
acceptable jurisdiction-stripping), this might suggest that Con-
gress would be free to strip jurisdiction if it did so without violat-
ing the anti-manipulation principle. This fact, in turn, begs the 
question of the meaning of "manipulation" in Boumediene's an-
ti-manipulation principle. 112 There would seem to be two basic 
options for defining "manipulation," one narrow and the other 
one broad. 
A narrow definition of manipulation might include an intent 
element, with a restrictive concept of intent. Using this defini-
tion, Congress would only violate the anti-manipulation prin-
ciple if it intended to use jurisdiction-stripping as a means to ex-
pand the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches. 113 
Congressional action based on this type of intent would certainly 
be troubling from a separation of powers point of view. It would 
represent a conscious attempt by Congress to remove itself or 
the President from constitutional supervision by the judiciary. 
And this narrow definition of manipulation would almost cer-
tainly sweep in-and render unconstitutional-some of the more 
egregious jurisdiction-stripping bills that have been proposed, 
such as those to bar judicial review in cases involving Congres-
sionally disfavored rights, such as cases dealing with abortion or 
fl b . 114 ag urnmg. 
However, this narrow definition of "manipulation" would 
permit jurisdiction-stripping laws which had the effect of prec-
luding judicial review in constitutional cases (and thus, of ex-
panding the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches) 
so long as that was not Congress's intent; that is, so long as Con-
gress had some other intent, such as promoting administrative 
efficiency or convenience. In other words, under this definition, 
Congress would be free to engage in jurisdiction-stripping-even 
112. The word "manipulation" is used by the Court in Boumediene. but with little 
explanation or definition. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
113. It is possible. I suppose, to define intent as nothing more than a desire to restrict 
jurisdiction. But that seems tautological. or at least meaningless. Presumably any statute 
restricting jurisdiction is based on intent to restrict jurisdiction. So a better conception of 
intent would seem to focus on intent to expand the constitutional prerogatives of the po-
litical branches. 
114. See supra notes 8-9; see also note 41 (noting professors who believe that juris-
diction-stripping is constitutionally problematic when it favors certain rights over others). 
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in constitutional cases-so long as it did so without (or so long as 
no one could prove) an intent to expand the constitutional pre-
rogatives of the political branches. 
This narrow definition seems problematic for at least four 
reasons. First, this definition would create a strange incentive for 
Congress to pass numerous, broad jurisdiction-stripping statutes 
that might just happen to shield Congress or the President from 
judicial review in certain constitutional cases. Additionally, such 
a narrow definition would seem to be at odds with the fact that 
some of the Court's strongest warnings regarding the problems 
with stripping jurisdiction over constitutional claims are con-
tained in cases where there was no hint of Congressional intent 
to expand the political branches' constitutional prerogatives; 
these warnings occurred in cases involving nothing more than 
preclusion of review of routine administrative law actions. 115 
Moreover, the fact that this narrow definition is based on Con-
gressional intent places it at odds with the Court's famous state-
ment in Ex Parte McCardle that Congressional intent is irrele-
vant in jurisdiction-stripping cases. 11 " Finally, intent-based 
standards are notoriously difficult to prove, especially when 
dealing with legislative bodies.117 
115. See supra notes 48-52. and accompanying text. 
116. See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506. 515 (1869). To the extent that the Court were to adopt 
a narrow. intent-based definition of manipulation. the inconsistency with McCardle might 
be explained in one of two ways. First. one might argue that the anti-intent language of 
McCardle was dicta. That is. the Court in McCardle may have been unconcerned with 
Congress's intent because Congress did not in fact foreclose all routes to the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Court. /d. at 515. Second. one might argue that it is far from clear that 
this aspect of McCardle is still good law. McCardle may be seen as the product of a by-
gone era in which the Court generally declined, or at least hesitated. to attempt to dis-
cern legislative intent-an era that arguably lasted until the early 1970s. See Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217. 224 (1971) (discussing pitfalls of court trying to discern legisla-
tive intent); United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367. 383 (1968) (explaining the risks of 
trying to perceive legislative intent); Fletcher v. Peck. 6 Cranch 87. 136 (1810) (elaborat-
ing on the difficulties of attempting to discover the legislative intent behind a statute). 
However. in later years. the Court has been far less concerned with such issues and regu-
larly assesses legislative intent. See, e.g., Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. 
Corp .. 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (assessing legislative intent); see also Washington v. Davis. 426 
U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring proof of legislative intent in Equal Protection claims). In this 
respect. one might read McCardle's hesitance to address legislative intent as having been 
overruled prior to Boumediene. But to the extent that (1) McCardle can be read as re-
flecting non-concern with legislative intent. and (2) this non-concern survived the Court's 
post-1970s focus on intent. Boumediene's third. anti-manipulation principle-and the 
limitation that principle imposes on that case's jurisdiction-stripping prohibition-must 
be understood as a repudiation of this aspect of McCardle. 
117. See Paul Brest. Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconsti-
tutional Legislative Motive. 1971 S. CT. REV. 95; Martin J. Katz. The Fundamental Inco-
herence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law. 94 GEO. 
L.J. 489 (2006). 
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A better definition of "manipulation" for purposes of Bou-
mediene's anti-manipulation principle, is a broader one based on 
effect, rather than intent: Congress should be seen as manipulat-
ing jurisdiction in violation of this principle any time it passes ju-
risdiction-stripping legislation which has the effect of expanding 
the political branches' constitutional prerogatives-irrespective 
of whether Congress intended this effect. This definition avoids 
the four problems with the narrower definition. It avoids incen-
tives to pass sweeping, non-specific jurisdiction-limiting legisla-
tion: is consistent with the Court's dicta in cases that do not seem 
to involve any intent to expand political branch prerogatives; 
does not run afoul of McCardle; and does not involve a proble-
matic search for legislative intent. 
Thus, Boumediene's anti-manipulation principle is best un-
derstood as being implicated any time that Congress passes a law 
that has the effect of precluding judicial review in a constitution-
al case, thereby expanding the constitutional prerogatives of the 
political branches-irrespective of whether this was Congress's 
intent. For this reason, I do not believe that my argument is li-
mited to cases in which someone can prove Congressional intent 
to expand its power or the President's power. But if the Court 
were to adopt the narrower definition of manipulation, my ar-
gument may well be limited to such cases. 
In summary, we can derive from Boumediene's three prin-
ciples the following rule regarding complete jurisdiction-
stripping: Congress cannot strip all jurisdiction over constitu-
tional claims. In such cases, Congress must leave in place some 
court capable of providing a meaningful check on the political 
branches. And while the judiciary may abstain from hearing such 
cases through doctrines such as justiciability, immunity, and the 
theater-of-war doctrine, the judiciary-not Congress-must de-
termine the boundaries of any doctrine that would preclude ju-
risdiction in constitutional cases. 
2. Lower Federal Courts and Fact-finding. 
We have seen how the three separation of powers principles 
deployed hy Boumediene to address the territorial scope of the 
Suspension Clause suggest a significant limit on Congress's pow-
er to preclude all federal jurisdiction. In this Section, I will show 
how a fourth principle articulated in Boumediene suggests a sig-
nificant limit on Congress's power to preclude lower court juris-
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diction. Specifically, this principle suggests that, at least in some 
cases, a lower court must be left open for fact-finding. 
In the context of discussing the requirements of an adequate 
substitute for habeas, Boumediene compared the procedures 
available under the DT A with those available under the basic 
habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 2241. In this comparison, 
Boumediene found particularly important the fact that Section 
2241 "accommodates the necessity for fact-finding that will arise 
in some cases by allowing the appellate judge or Justice to trans-
fer the case to a district court of competent jurisdiction, whose 
institutional capacity for fact-finding is superior to his or her 
,ItS 
own. 
In other words, the Court said, (1) in some cases, fact-
finding will be necessary, and (2) where fact-finding is necessary, 
some entity with the institutional capacity for fact-finding must 
remain open. This principle leaves open the question of which 
cases require fact-finding, a question I will address below. 119 But 
in such cases, Boumediene limits lower court jurisdiction-
stripping in one of two important ways. 
First, a strong reading of Boumediene's factfinder require-
ment might suggest that a lower federal court must be left open 
for fact-finding in such cases. Boumediene did specifically refer 
to "a district court. " 120 Moreover, as our federal courts are cur-
rently structured, federal district courts are designed to serve as 
the trial courts; the courts that are institutionally designed to 
find facts. This role would seem to make federal district courts 
the most obvious entities to satisfy Boumediene's factfinder re-
quirement. Thus, one could argue, Boumediene stands for the 
proposition that, at least in certain types of cases, Congress must 
leave open a particular type of court-a federal district court-
to find facts. 
However, this is probably an over-reading of Boumediene. 
A second, weaker, reading of Boumediene seems more plausible: 
Boumediene's factfinder requirement precludes Congress from 
closing down all lower federal courts unless a competent fact-
finder remains available. But the Court might well accept some-
one other than a lower federal court as a competent factfinder. 
For example, in at least some types of cases, a state court may be 
llR See Boumediene v. Bush 128 S. Ct. 2229.2266 (2008) (emphasis added). 
119. See infra Section II.C.2. 
120. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2266. 
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available as a factfinder. 121 Alternatively, in some cases, Boume-
diene's requirement of a competent factfinder might be satisfied 
by a federal agency or a non-Article III court. 122 
This second, weaker, reading would seem to be supported 
by Boumediene's functionalist approach to the question of com-
petence. In Boumediene, the Court did not focus specifically on 
which entities would be competent to review cases brought by 
prisoners at Guantanamo. Instead, it focused on the attributes 
which would qualify an entity to hear such cases: The entity must 
be "disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures 
designed to ensure its own independence."123 In other words, the 
factfinder must be (1) disinterested, and (2) independent. This 
set of qualifications would suggest that the factfinder does not 
necessarily need to be a lower federal court. It might be a state 
court or even a federal agency, so long as that state court or fed-
eral agency were sufficiently disinterested and independent.124 
In summary, Boumediene suggests an important limitation 
on Congress's widely assumed ability to strip jurisdiction from 
the lower federal courts: At least in certain types of cases, some 
entity must be available to perform fact-finding. And while it is 
not clear that this entity must be a lower federal court, it does 
need to be disinterested and independent. 
121. In Boumediene, there was no possibility that a state court could play any role. 
Ever since Tarb/e 's Case. it has been clear that a state court cannot hear a habeas case 
against the federal government; that is, a state court cannot order the federal government 
to release a prisoner. See 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871). However. as I will argue below in 
Section II.C.2. Boumediene's factfinder requirement is not limited to habeas cases. And 
the possibility of state courts serving as the requisite factfinders in constitutional cases 
may be viable in cases that do not involve habeas petitions against the federal govern-
ment. See supra text accompanying notes 103-106. 
122. See infra note 107. It also remains possible that the Supreme Court could serve 
as a factfinder. However. if the lower federal courts were closed, in the vast majority of 
cases the Supreme Court's jurisdiction would be limited to appellate jurisdiction, which 
might serve to limit its legal ability to engage in fact-finding. See U.S. CONST. art. III (di-
viding Supreme Court jurisdiction between original and appellate jurisdiction). 
123. Boumediene. 128 S. Ct., at 2269 (discussing attributes of criminal courts that 
seemed to be lacking in military commissions); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
533 (2004) (holding that the due process clause requires. "that a citizen-detainee seeking 
to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual 
basis for his classification. and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual asser-
tions before a neutral decisionmaker."). 
124. This principle has implications for the distinction between entities that are pri-
marily political and those that are more insulated from the political process. Specifically. 
an agency that is more independent from the President might be considered competent 
to act as a factfinder, while one that is less independent might not. See Bowshar v. Synar, 
478 U.S. 714. 726 (1986) (discussing, and applauding, the fact that the independent coun-
sel is independent of the executive branch. despite being part of that branch). 
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3. The Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction 
The Court in Boumediene does not say anything directly 
about Congress's ability to strip the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion pursuant to the Exceptions Clause. However, Boumediene's 
actions in this regard arguably speak louder than words, and may 
be understood as supporting the idea that Congress cannot p~ec­
lude all routes to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.120 
There is little ambiguity about Boumediene's actions. In this 
case, Congress unequivocally sought to bar the Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. The MCA provides, "No court, justice, or judge 
shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus" in cases such as Boumediene. 126 The Act 
also provides that, in non-habeas actions, the only federal court 
with jurisdiction is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia. 127 In other words, Congress made clear that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had no business hearing habeas cases or any 
other cases regarding Guantanamo detainees designated as 
enemy combatants. Yet the Supreme Court did not hesitate to 
take the case. Effectively, it acted as if Congress could not prec-
lude the Court from taking the case. 
Of course, the Court could have heard the Boumediene case 
solely for the purpose of deciding it did not have jurisdiction. 
But the Court's review was not so limited. Rather, the Court 
took the case and decided it on the merits-despite being highly 
aware of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA. This 
action suggests that the Court effectively rejected those provi-
sions insofar as they might have precluded its own appellate re-
view. 
The Court did not discuss this issue. So we do not know the 
basis for its action. However, the Court's action is consistent 
with strong dicta in cases going back nearly 140 years suggesting 
that, in exercising its Exceptions Clause power, Congress must 
leave open some route to Supreme Court review, at least certain 
cases. For example, in Ex Parte McCardle, the Court upheld an 
act by Congress that stripped the Court of appellate jurisdiction, 
but included a paragraph at the end of the opinion pointing out 
that another statutory route to the Court's appellate jurisdiction 
125. Section II.C.3. below. will discuss the types of cases to which this rule applies. 
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(l) (2006) (emphasis added). 
127. See id. § 2241(e)(2). incorporating Detainee Treatment Act §§ 1005(e)(2) and 
(3). 10 U.S.C. § 801 (granting exclusive jurisdiction for judicial review to D.C. Circuit in 
non-habeas cases). 
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remained available. 128 The implication was that the outcome 
might have been different had some alternative route not been 
left open. And in Felker v. Turpin, the Court reiterated this sug-
gestion in stronger terms. There, in upholding the 1996 Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Court emphasized 
that ( 1) the statute did not preclude all access to the Supreme 
Court, and (2) the availability of such access obviated constitu-
tional issues that might have otherwise plagued the statute. 129 
Justice Souter, along with two other Justices, expressly noted 
that "if it should later turn out that [other] statutory avenues ... 
were closed, the question whether the statute exceeded Con-
gress's Exceptions Clause power would be open."130 
In those cases, the Court essentially warned Congress that 
precluding all access to the Supreme Court might well be un-
constitutional. Thus, in Boumediene, where the Court accepted 
jurisdiction and decided the case on the merits in the face of a 
clear desire by Congress to preclude such review, it seems rea-
sonable to suppose that the Court's action may have been based 
on the rationale expressed in its earlier dicta: That Congress 
cannot exercise its Exceptions Clause power in a way that would 
close all avenues to the Court. Accordingly, Boumediene can 
plausibly be read as requiring that Congress leave open some 
route to the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 
C. THE UNIVERSALITY OF BOUMEDIENE: IT IS NOT JUST A 
HABEAS CASE 
The most obvious objection to the argument I have made is 
that, whatever principles Boumediene may have articulated or 
relied upon, such principles might be limited to habeas cases. Af-
ter all, Boumediene was a habeas case; a case challenging bodily 
detention. m And the ostensible basis for the Court's decision in 
Boumediene was the Suspension Clause-which applies only to 
habeas cases.132 
128. See Ex Parte McCardle. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506. 515 (1869). 
129. See Felker v. Turpin. 518 U.S. 651. 661 (1996). 
130. See id. at 667 (Souter. J .. concurring). 
131. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. 2240; see also HART & WECHSLER. supra note 10. at 
352 
The historic office [of habeas] is to test the lawfulness of bodily detentions .... 
In modern practice. habeas corpus is frequently employed as a mode of review-
ing criminal convictions obtained in courts. Historically. however. an even more 
fundamental role was to authorize judicial oversight of detentions imposed ex-
tra-judicially by executive officials. 
132. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2240; see also U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 9. cl. 2 (provid-
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It this were true, if Boumediene's answers to the jurisdic-
tion-stripping debate were limited to habeas cases, these answers 
would still be significant. If that were the case, we would at least 
have important guidance about the limits of Congress's jurisdic-
tion-stripping powers in habeas cases. But there is reason to be-
lieve that at least some, and perhaps all, of Boumediene's an-
swers extend well beyond habeas cases. The principles 
underlying those answers appear to apply to all constitutional 
claims. 
1. Stripping All Federal Jurisdiction: Boumediene 
Applies to All Constitutional Claims. 
My claim regarding the significance of Boumediene is 
strongest with respect to its implications for the general jurisdic-
tion-stripping question: the idea that, in exercising its jurisdic-
tion-stripping powers, Congress must leave in place some federal 
court to hear constitutional claims.133 This principle almost cer-
tainly extends beyond habeas cases. Rather, it applies to all con-
stitutional claims, irrespective of whether they involve detention. 
This scope is apparent from three aspects of the Court's opinion. 
First, the Boumediene Court made clear that it saw habeas 
as a means, not an end. The protection of constitutional rights 
was the end. The Court stated, "[T]he writ of habeas corpus is an 
indis&ensable mechanism for monitoring the separat!on of pow-
ers." · Elsewhere, the Court spoke of the compelling need to 
adhere to "freedom's first principles," and highlighted two such 
principles: One was "freedom from arbitrary and unlawful re-
straint"- that is, habeas. The other was "the personal liberty 
that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers." 135 In 
other words, the majority in Boumediene understood the case 
not just as a habeas case, but also more broadly as a separation 
of powers case. 
ing the text of the Suspension Clause): INS v. St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that 
Suspension Clause limits Congress's power to preclude habeas review). 
133. As noted above. there is some question as to whether, in some non-habeas cas-
es. a state court might suffice. See supra text accompanying notes 105-107. However. for 
purposes of this Section. I will refer to Boumediene's principle as requiring a federal 
court in constitutional cases. 
134. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2259. Professor Tyler makes a similar argument 
regarding habeas as a means to another end: that habeas serves to ensure due process. 
See Tyler. supra note 108. at 337. 
135. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2277. The Court also mentioned the importance 
of separation of powers principle at id. at 2263 (noting that the "gravity of the separation-
of-powers issues raised by these cases" was '"exceptional"). 
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In fact, the Court was explicit as to the way it saw the rela-
tionship between habeas and the separation of powers principles 
it articulated. Immediately after articulating its three separation 
of powers principles, the Court noted, "These concerns have 
particular bearing on the Suspension Clause question .... "136 In 
other words, the Court expressly saw the need for habeas as an 
example- a subset- of its broader concerns about separation of 
powers. 
Second, the three separation of powers principles that 
served as the foundation for the Boumediene Court's opinion 
apply not just to habeas cases; they apply to all constitutional 
claims. The core principle that animated Boumediene was the 
Court's assertion that judicial review is required to keep the po-
litical branches within the bounds of the Constitution. The 
Court's fear was that, by strategically locating operations in 
places such as Guantanamo that would arguably permit evasion 
of judicial review, the political branches could effectively trans-
gress the Constitution as they pleased- that they could "switch 
the Constitution on or off at will. " 137 Yet this fear cannot be li-
mited to habeas cases, or cases in which someone is in custody. 
The concern that, absent judicial review, the political branches 
could transgress the Constitution at will applies to any of the 
myriad ways in which the political branches can transgress the 
constitution even when no one is in custody.'38 
For example, suppose that the government fined people 
who refused to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, or barred them 
from voting. And suppose that the government could preclude 
judicial review of such fines or disenfranchisement. There would 
be no custody, and thus no habeas claims. Yet this would be ex-
actly the type of unlimited power-the same ability to transgress 
the Constitution with impunity-that the Boumediene Court 
feared. The principle applies not just to habeas cases; it applies 
to all constitutional claims. 13~ 
136. See id. at 2259. 
137. See id. 
138. Of course. in cases where someone is in custody. the availability of habeas may 
serve to address this concern. See INS v. St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289. 299 (2001) (distinguishing 
between judicial review and habeas and noting that leaving habeas intact avoided consti-
tutional problem). My point is that even in cases where habeas is not required. Boume-
diene·s separation of powers principle require judicial review. 
139. See Daniel J. Meltzer. Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 2537. 2573 (1998) (explaining that the checking-the-political-branches argument re-
quires judicial review in non-habeas. as well as habeas cases). 
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Third, the Boumediene Court's selection of authority sug-
gests that its principle applies in non-habeas cases. The claim 
that judicial review is necessary to keep the political branches 
within the bounds of the Constitution comes straight out of 
Marbury v. Madison. 140 And Boumediene clearly relied on that 
case, citing it directly for the proposition that the Court (as op-
posed to the political branches) must have the ability "to say 
what the law is."141 Yet Marbury was not a habeas case. Marbury 
established the courts' right to find that any type of action by the 
political branches violates the Constitution. That is, Marbury 
applied to all constitutional claims. And Boumediene's conscious 
embrace of Marbury suggests that its reasoning applies to all 
constitutional claims. 
These three arguments strongly suggest that Boumediene's 
answer to the general jurisdiction-stripping question- that Con-
gress cannot preclude all federal jurisdiction -extends beyond 
habeas cases. Rather, this principle extends to all constitutional 
claims. 142 
2. The Need for a Factfinder: Boumediene Applies to all 
Constitutional Claims. 
Boumediene's suggestion that Congress cannot preclude all 
lower federal court jurisdiction unless a disinterested and inde-
pendent factfinder remains available appears similar in scope: 
This principle appears to apply to all constitutional claims, or at 
least those constitutional claims that are fact-specific. 
One can, of course, argue that this principle is limited to ha-
beas cases. After all, Boumediene was a habeas case. And Bou-
mediene's discussion of the need for fact-findin9 occurred in the 
context of a discussion about habeas substitutes. 43 
However, the better view is that the principle applies to all 
constitutional claims. As discussed in the prior Section, Boume-
diene was concerned about protecting constitutional rights more 
140. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
141. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (citing Marbury. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177). 
142. Professor Claus offers another argument against limiting any jurisdiction-
stripping argument to habeas cases: He argues that the primary textual limit on jurisdic-
tion-stripping comes from Article III's vesting clause; that the Suspension Clause pre-
supposes the existence of jurisdiction. rather than itself requiring such jurisdiction. See 
Claus. supra note 13, at 109-12. However, Boumediene appears to be based on separa-
tion of powers principles. as opposed to the textualist principle set forth by Professor 
Claus. 
143. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2266. 
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generally- not just in habeas cases or cases involving deten-
tion.1+~ And in many constitutional cases, factfinding is essential. 
Without adequate fact-finding, there can be no adequate consti-
tutional review. 
Consider a simple example of the fact-dependency of consti-
tutional litigation. Suppose that Congress passed a statute prec-
luding any judicial review of facts in free speech cases. And sup-
pose that a speaker gave an anti-government speech. And 
finally, suppose that the government took the position that the 
speech was "incitement" (which is largely unprotected by the 
first amendment), and therefore sought to impose a large fine on 
the speaker. If the speaker defended on first amendment 
grounds, the case would largely turn on a factual determination: 
whether the speech was in fact "incitement"; that is, whether it 
was intended and likely to cause the audience imminently to vi-
olate the law. 145 Yet, as a result of the statute precluding review 
of facts, the court could not engage in meaningful review. It 
would be bound to accept the government's factual contention 
that the speech was "incitement." Effective!~, the government 
could suppress speech without judicial review. 46 
As discussed above, Boumediene seemed concerned with 
protecting constitutional rights, irrespective of whether the fail-
ure to do so results in detention. 147 It therefore seems likely that 
the Boumediene Court would require the availability of a fact-
finder not just in habeas or detention cases, but in all constitu-
tional cases. 
3. The Need for Supreme Court Appellate Review: The 
Unclear Scope of Boumediene 
The scope of Boumediene's implicit holding that Congress 
cannot foreclose all routes to the Supreme Court's appellate ju-
risdiction is less clear. This is in large part because we do not re-
ally know the Court's justification for this holding. 
The separation of powers principles that underlie Boume-
diene's suggested limits on complete jurisdiction-stripping do not 
144. See supra Section II.C.l. 
145. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444. 447 (1969) (holding ''incitement" 
not protected and defining that term). . . . 
146. This idea. that factfinding may control the outcome of constitutiOnal claims, was 
recognized by the Court in Crowell v. Benson. 285 U.S. 22 (1932) ("(W)herever funda-
mental rights depend. as not infrequently they do depend. upon facts .... finality as to 
facts becomes in effect finality in law."). 
147. See supra Section II.C.l. 
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apply to the Court's implicit holding that Congress cannot forec-
lose all avenues for its appellate review. These separation of 
powers principles require some judicial review. But they do not 
necessarily require judicial review by the Supreme Court exercis-
ing its appellate jurisdiction. Any federal (or possibly state) 
court should do. Accordingly, the idea that Congress is required 
to leave open some route to the Supreme Court's appellate ju-
risdiction must be based on some other argument. 
Actually, we do not really know what argument might un-
derlie Boumediene's willingness to ignore Congress's limit on its 
appellate jurisdiction. As noted above, Boumediene did not dis-
cuss its reasoning for accepting the appeal and deciding the case 
on the merits despite the MCA's removal of its appellate juris-
diction.14l< And to the extent that this action was based on dicta 
from earlier cases, those cases never discussed their reasoning 
either.149 Without an understanding of the reasoning for the prin-
ciple, it is difficult to know its scope. 
That is not to say that we have no clues as to the possible 
scope of Boumediene's implicit threat on stripping the Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction. There are three clues, two of 
which suggest a limited scope (that Boumediene's implicit hold-
ing regarding Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction is limited to 
habeas cases), and one of which suggests a broader scope. 
First, a reference within the Boumediene opinion suggests a 
limited scope. To understand this reference, it is important to 
keep in mind that the argument in favor Congress's ability to 
strip the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction is based on 
the fact that the Exceptions Clause of Article III gives Congress 
the power to "regulate" that jurisdiction.150 The Boumediene 
Court referred to this language only once. And that reference 
was clearly focused on the writ. Specifically, the Court noted that 
the Suspension Clause serves as "an 'exception' to the 'power 
given to Congress to regulate courts. "' 151 This suggests that the 
Court understood the limit on Congress's power to strip its ap-
pellate jurisdiction as coming from the Suspension clause-the 
Constitutional enshrinement of the writ. 152 
148. See supra Section II.B.3. 
149. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin. 51R U.S. 651 (1996): Ex Parte McCardle. 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 506.513-14 (1R69). 
150. See U.S. CONST. art. III.§ 2. 
151. Boumediene. 12R S. Ct. 2229. 2246 (2008). 
152. But see Claus. supra note 13. at 109-12 (arguing that the writ is enshrined in Ar-
ticle III. not the Suspension Clause). 
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Second, Boumediene's lineage in this area lies squarely 
within the realm of habeas. As noted above, Boumediene effec-
tively made good on a warning that the Court had provided sev-
eral times before: That, in exercising its Exceptions Clause pow-
er, Congress must leave open some appellate access to the 
Supre~e Court. Nota~~f' each of those earlier warnings oc-
curred m a habeas case. -
However, a third argument points the other way: to the 
need to preserve Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in cases 
beyond habeas. This argument has to do with the Court's view of 
its own necessity. As will be discussed in the following Part, 
Boumediene represents a fairly bold stroke by the Court.154 In 
that sense, the Supreme Court is clearly taking a leadership role 
in proclaiming the importance of federal judicial review in the 
constitutional structure. Given its leadership role, one might 
wonder if the Supreme Court would really ever allow itself to be 
sidelined, with final say over constitutional questions in non-
habeas cases given to lower federal courts. 155 
But at least for now, Boumediene seems to have: (1) une-
quivocally answered the question of whether Congress can close 
all routes to the Supreme Court in habeas cases (it cannot), but 
(2) left open the question of whether it must remain available as 
a forum in non-habeas cases. 
III. BOUMEDIENE AS AN ACT OF IMPERIALISM 
If all Boumediene had done was to provide answers-even 
partial answers-to the jurisdiction-stripping debate, that would 
be quite significant. But perhaps what is most significant about 
Boumediene was the Court's willingness to articulate the prin-
ciples it did, when historically it had been extremely hesitant to 
do so. 
As discussed above, the Court has tended to use a strong 
avoidance doctrine to avoid squarely facing the question of 
whether Congress can strip the courts of jurisdiction: Whenever 
possible (and sometimes even when it seemed impossible), the 
153. See Felker, 518 U.S. 651; McCardle, 74 U.S. 506. 
154. See infra Part III. 
155. See, e.g., Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 13, at 1008 (arguing that Supreme 
Court review is necessary to give meaning to the terms "supreme" and "inferior" in Ar-
ticle III): Claus, supra note 13, at 114 (articulating the same textual argument); Pfander, 
supra note 31 (making the same Article III argument). Boumediene, however, did not 
appear to consider this textual argument. 
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Court has interpreted statutes to find that they did not preclude 
all jurisdiction-thus avoiding the question of whether Congress 
could do so. 156 
Notably, the Court could have taken a similar approach in 
Boumediene-at least in a number of respects. The statutes in 
question (the DCA and MCA) actually gave jurisdiction to one 
federal court (the D.C. Circuit), and also created fact-finding 
bodies (the military commissions). 157 Notably, in a dissent by Jus-
tice Roberts, four of the Justices in Boumediene stated that these 
statutes could be read to provide these two entities with the 
power to perform all of functions that the majority deemed ne-
cessary for them to serve as an adequate substitute for habeas."" 
While the correctness of the dissent's statutory reading may 
be open for debate, that is not the point. The point is that this 
statutory reading was at least possible. It was plausible enough 
to have been adopted by four Justices. And it hardly seems less 
plausible than readings the Court has given to jurisdiction-
stripping statutes in many of its avoidance cases. 159 Such a read-
ing would have allowed the Court to avoid the constitutional 
question regarding the territorial scope of the Suspension 
Clause. And while such a reading might have yielded a result 
that differed formally from the one reached in Boumediene (it 
would not have provided the non-citizen detainees with the right 
to seek habeas), it would have yielded a similar-arguably indis-
tinguishable-practical result (a statutory process possessing all 
of the attributes of habeas that the Court saw as essential). 
Yet the Court did not choose this path of avoidance. In-
stead, the Boumediene Court read the statutes as precluding the 
type of process that would have provided an adequate habeas 
substitute, thereby forcing the constitutional question regarding 
the scope of the Suspension Clause.'(,() And the Court did not 
stop there. It went on to answer that constitutional question in 
the most forceful of ways, not merely striking down the DT A 
and MT A, but doing so based on broad and powerful separation 
of powers principles-principles suggesting the need for judicial 
156. See supra Section I. C.: see also Sager. supra note 13. at 20 ("'[T]he Court. for its 
part. has generally tried to avoid or soften confrontations with the national legislature."). 
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). 
158. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2283-85 (Roberts. J .. dissenting). 
159. See supra Section I. C. 
160. See Boumediene. 128 S. Ct. at 2270-75. 
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review to police other branches' compliance with the Constitu-
tion.1"1 In these ways, Boumediene was surely a bold decision. 
This boldness raises two key questions. First, it raises a de-
scriptive question: Why did the Court choose this case for such a 
bold act, after resisting the temptation to act in this way in so 
many earlier cases? Second, it raises a normative question: Is this 
boldness a good thing? Was Boumediene justifiably bold, or was 
it imperious? Should we be happy with Boumediene or frigh-
tened by it? While it is beyond the scope of this Article to at-
tempt to provide definitive answers to either of these questions, 
I will offer a few thoughts on each. 
With respect to the descriptive question of why the Court 
has acted in this way now, I will offer the observation that per-
haps it was provoked. On a micro level, the Court may have 
been provoked by the sheer amount of time that the detainees 
had been held by the government (some, nearly six years) with 
what the Court perceived as no meaningful opportunity to chal-
lenge their detentions. 162 But, as noted above, the court could 
have provided the detainees with process in a less bold man-
1~>3 
ner. 
More likely, the Court may have been provoked on a macro 
level. Since the beginning of the war on terror, President Bush 
had claimed extraordinary-some might say imperious-
powers.104 In response, one might have expected, perhaps hoped, 
161. See supra Section II.B. 
162. See Bownediene. 128 U.S. at 2275 (noting that. "In some of these cases six years 
have elapsed without the judicial oversight that habeas corpus or an adequate substitute 
demands."): see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507.520-21 (2004) 
It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no 
longer than active hostilities .... If the practical circumstances of a given conflict 
are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the 
law of war [permitting detentions for the duration of the conflict]. that under-
standing may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date. Active 
combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanis-
tan. 
Rasul v. Bush. 542 U.S. 466. 485 (2004) (noting "the Executive's potentially indefinite 
detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing"). 
163. See supra text following note 159; see also Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2293 (Ro-
berts. 1.. dissenting) (suggesting that Court's ruling might delay rather than expedite de-
tainees' release). 
164. See, e.g., CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); Linda Green-
house. Fundamental Questions: The Imperial Presidency and the Constraints of the Law. 
N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 18. 2004. at 07; see also JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE "WAR" ON TERROR (2007) 
(claiming that President Bush acted criminally in war on terror). 
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that the Court would step up and try to stop such exercises of an 
imperial presidency. 165 
In this respect, one might even comment on the Court's re-
straint. The Court certainly had the opportunity to push back 
against an imperious President in earlier cases, such as Hamdi 
and Hamdan. But notably, in its earlier cases in the war on ter-
ror, the Court did not push back directly against the President. 
Instead, the Court looked to Congress to control any excesses of 
an imperial presidency. 106 For example, in Hamdi, the Court in-
vited Congress to create a set of procedures for military tribunals 
to determine "enemy combatant" status.167 And in Hamdan, the 
Court invited the President to ask Congress to pass a law autho-
rizing him to use military commissions to try individuals accused 
of certain types of wrongdoing. 168 
The idea seemed like a sound one. If the Court could stand 
back and let Congress act as a check on an imperial President, 
the problem might be solved-the imbalance redressed-with no 
need for the Court to seem imperious. 169 The problem is that, in 
the climate of the war on terror, Congress seemed only too hap-
py to comply with any request from the President. 170 
In fact, the Court might have come to view Congress not as 
a check on imperious presidential power, but as an enabler of 
such power. After the Court ruled against the President and held 
165. Linda Greenhouse expressed this hope in two articles. one in 2002 and the other 
in 2004-before the Supreme Court had acted on any of the "war on terror" cases. See 
Greenhouse, supra note 164. at D7: Linda Greenhouse, War of Secrets: Judicial Restraint: 
The Imperial Presidency vs. the Imperial Judiciary. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8. 2002 at D3. 
166. See William N. Eskridge. Jr. & Philip P. Frickey. Quasi-Constitlllional Law: 
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking. 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (ar-
guing that the Court uses statutory construction rules to force Congress to consider con-
stitutional issues): Friedman, supra note 54. at 670 (describing how Congress may pro-
mote dialogue over constitutional issues by prodding Congress to act):. 
167. See Hamdi, at 538. 
168. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749. 2799 (Breyer, J .. concurring) ("Con-
gress has denied the President the legislative authority to create military commissions of 
the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek 
the authority he believes necessary."). 
169. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990) (arguing that the Court 
should take on the role of promoting discourse between the political branches in for-
eign/military affairs matters). But see Owen Fiss. The War Against Terrorism and the 
Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235. 239 (2006) (criticizing Court for refusing 
to engage core substantive issues in cases regarding the war on terror). 
170. It is arguable that Congress has been too eager to cede power to the President 
even in matters that do not involve war. See Clinton v. New York. 524 U.S. 417 (1998) 
(holding that Congress impermissibly tried to give power to the President to veto specific 
items in spending bill). 
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that the general habeas statute permitted review of aliens at 
Guantanamo,171 Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act 
(DTA), precluding such review. 172 And after the Court ruled 
against the President and held that the DT A was not retroactive 
(thereby permitting review of claims that were already pending) 
and that Congress had not authorized trials by military commis-
sions,m Congress passed the Military Commissions Act, preclud-
ing pending claims and authorizing trial by military commis-
sions.174 So it may well have appeared to the Boumediene Court 
that Congress simply was not up to the task of counter-balancing 
an imperious executive. Thus, the Court may have decided to 
take that role upon itself. 
As to the normative question of whether this is a good 
thing, this is even harder to say. But here, too, I will offer a few 
observations, both prudential and structural. 
As a prudential matter, the question is whether the Court 
should have avoided or engaged the constitutional question. The 
avoidance doctrine makes some sense. It allows the Court to 
avoid difficult questions, where the Court risks making decisions 
. it may later regret. 175 It might make sense for the Court to try, at 
least in the first instance, to prod Congress into doing the right 
thing. 170 Avoidance also allows the Court to take a stance of hu-
mility, avoiding grand proclamations of its own power or of 
Congress's lack of power. The doctrine avoids the possibility of a 
constitutional stand-off, in which a political branch might refuse 
to follow an order of the Court (though this possibility seems 
less likely in modern times). 177 And the doctrine arguably pro-
171. See Rasul v. Bush. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 224l(e) (2006). 
173. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 224l(e). Although the dissent in Boumediene attempts to cha-
racterize the MCA as a careful balancing act by Congress. the Act incorporates most of 
the features of the President's program that were most problematic. including (I) the 
Commissions can still hear and consider hearsay evidence. (2) the Commissions can still 
hear and consider evidence extracted through "extended interrogation techniques:· so 
long as that evidence was obtained prior to the DT A, and (3) suspects may still be barred 
from learning about. and therefore effectively refuting, evidence against them that has 
been classified as secret. See id. The MCA also sought to quash all outstanding habeas 
petitions. See id. In other words, the MCA purported to give to the President most, if not 
all. of the powers he asserted prior the passage of that statute. 
175. See, e.g., Gordon G. Young. Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and 
rhe Preservation of Judicial Review. 78 TEx. L. REV. 1549 (2000). 
176. See Eskridge & Frickey. supra note 166 (discussing Court's use of statutory con-
struction rules to force Congress to consider constitutional issues); Friedman, supra note 
54. at 668-69 (discussing Court's role in facilitating dialogue over constitutional issues). 
177. Compare CHEMERINSKY. supra 7, at 46 (noting that at time of Marbury. the 
President would almost certainly have disregarded an order of the Court with which he 
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motes a certain healthy uncertainty. Perhaps it is a good thing 
for the judiciary to have to worry about jurisdiction-stripping, 
and for Congress to have to worry about whether it has this 
17X power. 
Of course, there may also be a time for certainty and back-
bone, rather than uncertainty and forbearance. As discussed 
above, the Court may have been responding to a sense that the 
President was out of control and that Congress was not likely to 
stand up to him. Perhaps this was a time for action, rather than 
avoidance. 
As a structural matter, the general idea of one branch rising 
to challenge another branch that seems to be accumulating too 
much power makes some sense. And it is hardly a new idea. It is 
part of the Framers' design. Notably, more than 200 years ago, 
soon-to-be-Chief Justice John Marshall expressed the idea in 
connection with the presidential campaign of 1800. In that cam-
paign, he opposed Thomas Jefferson because he feared that Jef-
ferson would be too close with Congress. 179 In other words, for 
Marshall, it was critically important for each branch of the gov-
ernment to operate independently. The idea of one acting as a 
rubber stamp for another, as often seems to happen in the war 
on terror, would seem problematic-perhaps problematic 
enough to warrant the third branch in stepping up to serve as a 
check to the other two. 
On the other hand, there are also some potential negatives 
to the Court stepping in to check an imperious President and 
compliant Congress. First, it is not clear where or whether this 
model-imperiousness spawned by imperiousness-ever ends. If 
one branch repeatedly asserts greater power in response to other 
branches' assertions, all of the branches may eventually end up 
incredibly powerful. Of course, it is possible that the existence of 
powerful branches counteracting powerful branches might rend-
er the government as a whole impotent, rather than powerful. 
But it could also result in a federal government that Is, as a 
disagreed). with id. at 356 (noting President Nixon's compliance with Court's order to 
comply with subpoena). For a detailed discussion of the concept of constitutional crises. 
see Jack M. Balkin. Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises. 26 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 579 (2008). 
178. See HART & WECHSLER. supra note 10. at 342 ("'[T]he existence of congres-
sional power of unspecified scope [may] contribute to the maintenance of a desirable 
tension between Court and Congress."). 
179. See JAMES F. SIMON. WHAT KIND OF NATION 138-172 (2003). 
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whole, quite powerful, a problematic prospect for those con-
cerned about federal power generally. 
Second, the way in which the Court has asserted its power-
by proclaiming principles that limit Congress's ability to stop its 
own exercise of power-raises the specter of an out-of-control 
court. Remember the whole justification for the Court's asser-
tion of its power: Someone must limit the political branches or 
they will exercise unlimited power. But who will limit the power 
of the judiciary? 1"0 One might argue that we need not fear this 
"least dangerous branch," which generally needs the help of 
another branch to implement its will. 1" 1 But in opinions like 
Boumediene. the Court hardly looks weak. 
On balance, it is difficult to say whether Boumediene is a 
good decision. My personal inclination at this point is positive. 
There is no doubt that presidential power-or at least claimed 
presidential power-has expanded with the war on terror. 182 It is 
far from clear to me that Congress has the stomach to serve as a 
meaningful check on that power. And the likelihood of Congress 
serving as a meaningful check is further reduced by the fact that 
many if not most of the targets of expanded presidential power 
are members of unpopular minority groups who may not have 
much influence with Congress. 183 At times like this, I draw com-
fort from the idea of a powerful court serving as a check on ex-
ecutive power. But that may be simply because I do not particu-
larly fear out of control judicial power at this point in history. 
Put differently, how one reacts to the prospect of a bold 
court may come down to the question of whom one fears most. 
Those who fear an out-of-control executive (and fear that a 
weak Congress will not have the backbone or ability to limit the 
President) will likely cheer the arrival of an assertive judiciary. 1 ~<~ 
180. See Cary v. Curtis. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845) ("To deny [Congress's power to 
control jurisdiction] would be to elevate the judicial over the legislative branch of the 
government. and to give to the former powers limited by its own discretion merely."). 
quoted in Hart. supra note 13. at 1366-71. 
181. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
182. See, e.g .. Balkin. supra note 177. at 583 ("President Bush pushed hard for an 
increase in presidential power. greater secrecy. and limited accountability for the Execu-
tive. arguing that these changes were necessary to fight the global war on terror."). 
183. See Claus. supra note 13. at 62 (noting particular danger when jurisdiction-
stripping is directed against minorities). 
184. See, e.g .. Geoffrey S. Corn. Boumediene v. Bush and the Role of the Courts in 
the War on Terror: The Intersection of Hyperbole, Military Necessity, and Judicial Review. 
43 New ENG. L. REV .. (forthcoming 2009). In fact. some commentators have criticized the 
Court for not going far enough; for focusing on issues of its own power as opposed to the 
rights of those detained. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 3. at I. 
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On the other hand, those who fear unaccountable and out-of-
touch judges micromanaging the war on terror will likely loathe 
a decision such as Boumediene. Pick your evil. 
CONCLUSION 
Although it was a habeas case, Boumediene has a great deal 
to say about jurisdiction-stripping. The separation of powers 
principles deployed in that case suggest significant limits on 
Congress's ability to strip jurisdiction from the federal courts in 
ways that are not likely limited to habeas cases. And perhaps 
more importantly, the Court's willingness to answer these ques-
tions and deploy these principles, which it has largely avoided 
for ages, may herald the arrival of a Court whose boldness is ei-
ther (1) is imperious and frightening, (2) is appropriate to match 
the imperiousness of the President, or (3) both. It depends on 
who you fear most. 
